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I. INTRODUCTION 
American annual consumer expenditures of nearly two trillion 
dollars involve approximately sixty-four percent of the country's 
Gross National Product. l A substantial portion of those consumer 
purchases result in some sort of dissatisfaction.2 The term "con­
sumer dissatisfaction" represents a large continuum of feelings 
ranging from mild disappointment to all consuming rage.3 Con­
'" Assoc. Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., Marietta College 
(1967); J.D., Rutgers School of Law at Newark (1978); LL.M., University of Illinois 
(1984). 
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 432 (105th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as ABSTRACT]. The figure 
given for consumer expenditures ($2,156,000,000,000)" is the amount for "Personal 
Consumption Expenditures" which includes the "market value of goods and services 
purchased by individuals and nonprofit institutions, and [the] value of food, clothing, 
housing, and financial services received by them as income in kind." !d. at 435. 
2. Professor David A. Rice reports that the "annual cost to consumers of 
marketplace fraud and deception run[s] into billions of dollars." D. RICE, CONSUMER 
TRANSACTIONS 18 (1975). He describes the consumer marketplace as "problem-fraught 
rather than problem-free." ld. at 19. Consumer dissatisfaction is particularly difficult to 
quantifY in monetary terms because only one-third of actual complaints are reported to 
government agencies. Professor Rice refers to this as the "tip-of-the-iceberg 
phenomenon." ld. at 1 (Supp. 1978). A recent national survey concluded that 14% of 
the population was aware of having been deceived in the marketplace at least once 
during a one-year period. A wide variety of deceptive practices were cited, including 
sales of defective products, overcharges, use of misleading advertising, and 
misrepresentation of financial arrangements. A. BEST, WHEN CONSUMERS COMPLAIN 101 
(1981). 
3. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders attributed some of the 
civil violence of the 1960's to certain populations' beliefs that they suffered from 
constant abuses by local merchants who both charged exorbitant prices and sold inferior 
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sumer dissatisfaction is a serious societal problem for a variety of 
reasons. It indicates a misallocation of scarce resources.4 It can be 
a significant factor in producing the perception that the economic 
and political institutions are unfair, ineffective, or unresponsive. 
That perception can have wide ranging political ramifications.5 Fi­
nally, it may be an indication of genuine political and economic 
unfairness.6 
Consumer dissatisfaction is often caused by advertising or other 
marketing practices that create unrealistic expectations on the part 
of consumers regarding the properties or effectiveness of products 
or services. Advertising, both true and untrue, plays a significant 
role in determining how consumer dollars are spent. Approxi­
mately seventy-billion dollars are spent annually on advertising.7 
Therefore, the part that advertising plays in consumer misapprehen­
sion regarding the properties or effectiveness of products8 deserves 
our attention. 
A number of governmental institutions and substantive legal doc­
trines have been established to resolve consumer disputes and to 
prevent consumer dissatisfaction. The Federal Trade Commission 
(Commission) often is considered the prime federal agency protect­
ing consumers from false advertising. The Commission administers 
a number of statutes which seek to protect consumers in the market­
place;9 the most inclusive of those laws is Section Five ofthe Federal 
Trade Commission Act (FTCA) which prohibits "unfair and decep­
quality goods. Such exploitation was a traceable cause of civil unrest. NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 274 (1968). 
4. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. 
5. See, e.g., L. NADER, No ACCESS TO LAw 4 (1980) ("We have also found that ... 
consequences of a lack of access of judicial remedy have had a serious effect on the 
machinery of government, on the mental health of Americans. and on the crime rate.") 
Ms. Nader further explains that the absence of an efficient complaint processing system 
leads to a search for alternatives to the law. ld. 
6. The prior text sentence refers primarily to the response of people who believe 
that they have been treated wrongly. This text sentence is included to highlight the fact 
that even those who are not the subject ofunfairness may not find unfairness acceptable. 
See, e.g., D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963). 
7. ABSTRACT. supra note I, at 567. 
8. Throughout this paper, purchases of products under a misapprehension will 
include goods, realty, and services purchased under a misapprehension regarding 
usefulness for the consumer's needs. 
9. For Commission regulations under statutes other than the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, see 16 C.F.R. § 300 (Wool Products Labeling Act); § 301 (Fur 
Products Labeling Act); § 303 (Textile Fiber Products Indentification Act); § 304 
(Hobby Protection Act); § 305 (Energy Policy & Conservation Act); § 500 (Fair 
Packaging & Labeling Act); § 700 (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act) (1984). The Truth in 
Lending Act provides for Commission enforcement. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1982). 
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tive acts and practices."IO This language has been used for eighty­
four years as the basis of the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate 
advertising. ll The Commission has regulated advertising by enact­
ing a variety of Trade Regulation Rules12 and by ordering various 
advertisers to "cease and desist" advertising campaigns that the 
Commission determines are deceptive. 13 
Traditionally, identification of an advertisement as deceptive14 in­
volved a determination that the advertiser was making false claims 
about the nature of the product. I5 The Commission has employed 
10. Section 5 of the ¥rCA is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). Subsection 5(a)(l) 
presently reads as follows: "Unfair methods of competition, in or affecting commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared 
unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). 
11. The Federal Trade Commission was established by Congress in 1914. The 
original purpose behind establishment of this independent regulatory agency was to 
enforce the emerging public antitrust policy. The statute creating the Commission 
declared that "unfair methods of competition" were unlawful and empowered the 
Commission to prevent such conduct. Act of Sept. 26,1914, ch. 311, § 45(a)(I), 38 Stat. 
717, 719 (1914). The phrase was selected to avoid the implication that the statute 
simply codified the. common law unfair competition doctrine. See 51 CONGo REc. 12,145 
(1914) (statement of Rep. Hollis). From the beginning of its existence, the Commission 
interpreted that language as preventing untruthful advertising. See, e.g., FTC V. Winsted 
Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922); Sears, Roebuck & CO. V. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 
(7th Cir. 1919). That interpretation of the statute was never entirely successful. 
Although courts acknowledged that "unfair methods of competition" encompassed 
more than was outlawed by prior antitrust statutes and common law, they also held that 
the Commission must demonstrate that there was some harm done to "competition," 
rather than consumers, by the practice it was opposing. In other words, the Commission 
had to find that competitors had lost business because of the advertising. See, e.g., FTC 
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931). Because untruthful advertising was likely to 
harm a competitor of the advertiser by taking sales away from the competitor, it was 
usually easy to establish such conduct as harmful to competition. 
Nevertheless, in 1938, Congress amended § 5 of the FTCA to explicitly outlaw "unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices." Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3,52 Stat. 111, III (1938) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982». Hence, the authority of the Commission to 
move against false advertising was not in doubt. 
The Commission's authority is illustrated by the following statement: "The definition 
is broad enough to cover every form of advertisement deception over which it would be 
humanly practicable to exercise governmental control. It covers every case of 
imposition on a purchaser for which there could be a practical remedy." H.R. REP. No. 
1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). 
12. The authority of the Commission to enact Trade Regulation Rules is found at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 46(g), 57a(91)(B) (1982). 
13. The authority of the Commission to issue cease and desist orders is found at 15 
U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982). 
14. Although § 5 of the FTCA also provides the Commission with jurisdiction over 
unfair practices, and the Commission has recognized the failure to substantiate 
advertising claims as an "unfair" practice, it is appropriate to discuss advertising 
substantiation only in the context of deceptive acts or practices. That point is more fully 
developed in notes 80·101 supra and accompanying text. 
15. See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. V. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (1944); Meredith 
Corp., 101 F.T.C. 390 (1983). 
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another approach to the concept of deception. An advertiser vio­
lates the FTCA by making claims about a product when the adver­
tiser does not have a reasonable basis to believe the claim, i.e., the 
advertiser lacks sufficient substantiation for the claim. This "rea­
sonable basis doctrine" forms the root ofwhat is known as the Com­
mission's advertising substantiation program. I6 That program 
involves (or has involved) collecting and disseminating to the public 
the substantiation for particular advertising claims, as well as penal­
izing advertisers who make claims without a sufficient substantiation 
for those claims. 
The advertising substantiation program often is recognized as a 
significant aspect of the Commission's consumer protection ef­
forts. I7 Nearly all complaints, decisions, and consent orders involv­
ing deceptive advertising at least partly are based on the doctrine 
that advertisers should have substantiation for claims. 18 The adver­
tising substantiation program was the subject of one of the two ma­
jor policy statements regarding consumer protection that have been 
issued by the Commission during the Reagan administration. 19 
A number of issues regarding the· application of the substantiation 
requirement remain unresolved. Those issues involve: identifying 
the standard for determining the appropriate level of substantiation 
by advertisers, deciding whether substantiation developed after a 
claim is made should be considered, deciding whether the Commis­
sion should proceed by rule or adjudication in establishing the sub­
stantiation requirement, and deciding whether the substantiation 
materials should be available to the public. After a brief history of 
the substantiation requirement, this article will establish a theo~eti-
16. The reasonable basis doctrine was first explicitly announced in Pfizer, 81 F.T.C. 
23,62 (1972). To the extent that the Commission has a "program," it can be traced to a 
Commission resolution announcing that advertisers will be expected to produce 
substantiation on request. 36 Fed. Reg. 12,058 (1971). 
17. See, e.g., F. MILLER & B. CLARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 
23 (1980) (describing activities of advertising substantiation program as "some of the 
most important activities of the Commission relating to advertising"); Federal Trade 
Commission, Advertising Substantiation Program, Request for Comments, 48 Fed. Reg. 
10471, 10472 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Request] ("The Commission remains 
committed to this principle, which has been an important element of the Commission's 
program for deterring unfair and deceptive claims and preserving public confidence in 
advertising."). 
18. See infra note 53. 
19. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING THE 
ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION PROGRAM (undated) [hereinafter cited as SUBSTANTIATION 
STATEMENT]. This statement was appended to the decision in Thompson Medical Co., 
104 F.T.C. 648,839 (1984). The other policy statement deals with the definition of 
deception itself. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION 
(1983) [hereinafter cited as DECEPTION STATEMENT]. 
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cal basis for that requirement. That basis will be used to resolve the 
issues which have arisen. 
II. HISTORY OF THE ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION PROGRAM 
In 1971 the Commission issued a resolution requiring advertisers, 
upon request, to submit whatever substantiation in support of 
safety, performance, efficacy, or comparative price claims that was in 
their possession at the time the claims were disseminated.20 The 
authority for this procedure was Section 6(b) of the ITCA 21 and 
hence these surveys were referred to as "Section 6(b) rounds" or 
"industry rounds." The questionnaires could be far reaching, ask­
ing for substantiation for expressed and implied claims and even for 
competitors' claims.22 Originally, the Commission established this 
requirement to make information available to consumers to enable 
them to make more rational buying decisions and to encourage 
competitors to challenge unfounded advertisements.23 
20. Federal Trade Commission, Special Reports Relating to Advertising Claims, 36 
Fed. Reg. 12,058 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Reports]. This may have been partly in 
response to a petition received by the Commission in 1970 requesting that it promulgate 
a rule requiring national advertisers to make available to the Commission, and through 
the Commission to the public, the scientific information they had developed to support 
advertising claims. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EVOLUTION AND EVALUATION OF THE AD 
SUBSTANTIATION PROGRAM SINCE 1971 5 (Dec. 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as EVOLUTION]. 
21. Section 6(b), Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 996-37 (1979) is 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) and provides in pertinent part as follows: 
[The Commission shall also have the power to) require, by general or 
special orders, persons, partnerships, and corporations engaged in or 
whose business affects commerce ... to file with the Commission in such 
form as the Commission may prescribe annual or special, or both annual 
and special, reports. or answers in writing to specific questions, 
furnishing to the commission such information as it may require as to the 
organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to 
other corporations, partnerships. and individuals.... Such reports and 
answers shall be made under oath, or otherwise as the Commission may 
prescribe, and shall be filed with the Commission within such reasonable 
period as the Commission may prescribe .... 
15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1982). 
22. See infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text for a description of the 
questionnaires. 
23. The Commission identified five policy reasons in support of its action: 
1. Public disclosure can assist consumers in making a rational choice 
among competing claims which purport to be based on the objective 
evidence and in evaluating the weight to be accorded to such claims. 
2. The public's need for this information is not being met voluntarily 
by advertisers. 
3. Public disclosure can enhance competition by encouraging 
competitors to challenge advertising claims which have no basis in fact. 
4. The knowledge that documentation or the lack thereof will be 
made public will encourage advertisers to have on hand adequate 
substantiation before claims are made. 
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However, consumers and consumer groups were reported to have 
demonstrated little interest in the information after it was made 
available to the public.24 Instead, the program became little more 
than an adjunct of Commission litigation against advertisers.25 Af­
ter analyzing the information submitted, the Commission could in­
stitute an action against the advertiser for engaging in an unfair and 
deceptive trade practice, i.e., making a claim without sub­
stantiation.26 
Congress assured the demise of the advertisement substantiation 
program as a vehicle for increasing the fund of product information 
available to the general public by sharply limiting the ability of the 
Commission to make public the information it obtained in the 6(b) 
rounds.27 The Commission no longer may release to the public in­
formation gathered pursuant to a process "a purpose of which is to 
determine whether any person may have violated any provision of 
the laws administered by the Commission. . . . "28 Because at least 
one purpose of the 6(b) request29 is the determination of whether 
the seller has violated Section 5 by failing to possess substantiation 
for any advertising claims, information gathered as part of the pro­
gram no longer may be made public.30 
5. The Commission has limited resources for detecting claims which 
are not substantiated by adequate proof. By making documentation 
submitted in response to this resolution available to the public the 
Commission can be alerted by consumers, businessmen, and public 
interest groups to possible violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 
Reports, supra note 20. 
With the adoption of this resolution, the Commission served automobile manufactur­
ers with substantiation orders and has since conducted twenty-nine industry rounds. See 
Request, supra note 17, at 10471; EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at App. A. 
24. See infra notes 335-36 and accompanying text. 
25. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 12. 
26. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 87 F.T.C. 756 (1976). 
27. The original authority of the Commission to release the substantiation materials 
to the public was based on the following provision: "[The Commission shall have the 
power to] make public from time to time such portions of the information obtained by it 
hereunder as are in the public interest. ..." 15 U.S.C. § 46(1) (1982). In Section 3(a)(2) 
of the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 
§ 3(a)(2), 94 Stat. 374, 375, the following amendment was made to 15 U.S.C. 46(1): 
"Provided, That the Commission shall not have any authority to make public any trade 
secret or any commercial or financial information which is obtained from any person and 
which is privileged or confidential. ..." 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1982). 
28. Id. at § 57b-2. 
29. In fact, as discussed above, this had become the primary reason for collecting the 
data. 
30. It does not appear that the Congress or the Commission anticipated this result of 
the amendment when it was being considered. 
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The requirement that advertisers against whom no misconduct 
has been alleged must supply substantiation for claims is novel in 
the law. A few Commission Trade Regulation Rules apply the pol­
icy of requiring the submission of advertising substantiation.31 A 
few states also have imposed such requirements.32 Congress once 
considered a "Truth In Advertising Act"33 which would require 
manufacturers to supply substantiation for their advertising claims 
upon consumer demand and which would make it unlawful to 
disseminate an advertisement without having documentation 
available.34 
Closely allied to the policy of requiring advertisers to collect sub­
stantiation materials is the policy of requiring advertisers to have a 
certain level of support for claims. In 1972, the Commission, in Pfi­
31. See, e.g., Rules for Using Energy Costs & Consumption Information Used in 
Labeling and Advertising for Consumer Appliances Under the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act, 16 C.F.R. § 350.8(a) (1984) (requires manufacturers to submit 
reports to Commission listing annual energy cost or energy efficiency ratings of 
appliances and methods of exacting these ratings); Labeling and Advertising of Home 
Insulation, 16 C.F:R. § 460.9 (1984) (manufacturers must keep records ofmethods used 
to test R-values); 16 C.F.R. § 306.6 (1984) (refiners, producers, and distributors of 
gasoline must keep records of octane ratings); 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (Guide for Use of 
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising states that testimonials cannot contain 
information which "could not be substantiated." The language does not make dear 
whether prior substantiation is required.); 16 C.F.R. § 255.2 (advertiser should be able 
to substantiate that consumer endorsements are representative of consumer opinions in 
general); 16 C.F.R. § 255.3 (drug endorsements must be substantiated). 
32. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508 (West Supp. 1983) (advertiser whose 
claims are based on effectiveness of product must provide facts on which claims are 
based); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 124.09 (1983) (persons making price comparisons must 
substantiate basis on which price comparison was made). The Law Department of 
Colorado recently focused attention on misleading comparative price discount 
advertising in one industry by requesting approximately 30 retailers to substantiate 
"implied" regular prices from which items are discounted. Letter from Penelope E. 
Brown, Colorado Consumer Protection Unit Legal Assistant, to Charles Shafer (Feb. 15, 
1984). The Ohio Administrative Code declares it an unfair and deceptive act or practice 
for a supplier to fail to document the specific factors relied upon to arrive at a sufficient 
supply of an advertised good to meet consumer demand when a raincheck is not given. 
OHIO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 109:4-3-03-(C)-(7) (1983). The Ohio Attorney General's 
Office has used its subpoena power to require a supplier to document claims made in 
advertisements. Letter ofAnthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Ohio Attorney General, to Charles 
Shafer (March 6, 1984). 
33. S. 1512, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), 119 CONGo REC. 11,527-29 (1973). 
34. 	The statute would have provided that: 

It shall be unlawful for any person to disseminate ... any 

advertisement concerning the safety, performance, efficacy, 
characteristics, or comparative price of any product or service unless 
documentation is available at the principal office of such person in the 
United States for public inspection, including the furnishing of copies of 
such documentation to any person requesting such documentation.... 
Ill. at 11,528. 
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zer, Inc., first set forth the proposition that an advertiser violated the 
¥TCA by making a claim without possessing sufficient information 
to constitute a "reasonable basis" for that claim.35 In Pfizer the re­
spondent had been marketing a sunburn treatment called "Un­
Burn" by a variety of advertisements which the Commission con­
cluded made two affirmative product claims: Un-Burn actually anes­
thetizes nerves in sunburned skin and Un-Burn stops pain fast. 36 
Although the Commission determined that the staff had not proven 
successfully that Pfizer lacked a reasonable basis for the claims, the 
Commission held that it would be an unfair practice to make such 
claims without a reasonable basis.37 
There is no real common law antecedent for the proposition that 
merely making a claim without substantiation (whether the claim is 
true or false) is actionable. Although there is a tort doctrine that it 
can be fraudulent to make a statement without the confidence im­
plied in the statement,38 that doctrine is merely a substitute for the 
scienter requirement in common law deceit actions,39 not a substi­
tute for the requirement that the statement itself must be untrue in 
order for it to be actionable. There are some earlier Commission 
decisions which foreshadow the reasonable basis doctrine. In an 
early case, an electronics school was charged with exaggerating the 
possibilities of getting jobs in the TV industry after graduation from 
the school. The court upheld the Commission, even though the 
agency presented no evidence that the school was wrong in predict­
ing the possibility of future jobs, because the advertiser could not 
substantiate its claims.4Q In a case involving an inflatable swimming 
device, the manufacturer requested the Commission to grant a con­
tinuance to give the manufacturer time to develop substantiation for 
the challenged claims.41 Although the case was ostensibly decided 
on the basis of rules requiring prompt action by the Commission, 
the Commission stated: 
While we are not deciding the instant case on such a 
ground, we are inclined to think that an advertiser is under a 
duty, before he makes any representation which, if false, could 
cause injury to the health or personal safety of the user of the 
advertised product, to make reasonable inquiry into the truth 
35. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.R.C. 23, 64 (1972). 
36. /d. at 65. 
37. ld. at 62. 
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526(b} (1977) [hereinafter cited as RE­
STATEMENT]. 
39. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
40. De Forest's Training, Inc. v. FTC, 134 F.2d 819,821 (7th Cir. 1943). 
41. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1293 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964). 
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or falsity of the representation. He should have in his posses­
sion such information as would satisfy a reasonable and pru­
dent businessman, acting in good faith, that such 
representation was true. To make a representation of this 
sort, without such minimum substantiation, is to demonstrate 
a reckless disregard for human health and safety, and is clearly 
an unfair and deceptive practice.42 
Later, in Pfizer, Inc., the Commission announced the doctrine but 
refused to apply it; however, the Commission since has found a 
number of advertisers liable for making unsubstantiated claims.43 
The scope of the reasonable basis doctrine has been discussed and 
revised in a recent series of cases involving over-the-counter analge­
sic products and in a Commission policy statement.44 
The policy of requiring a certain level of substantiation for claims 
has surfaced in other contexts. The Commission has included sub­
stantiation requirements in some rules. The Commission's Guides 
Against Deceptive Pricing, adopted in 1967, require advertisers to 
be "reasonably certain" that a substantial number of sales are made 
at the price to which it compares its own.45 A retailer should have 
"at least a general knowledge of the prices being charged in his 
area."46 Franchisers are required to have a reasonable basis for rep­
resentations made to potential franchisees.47 A few state consumer 
protection laws also include substantiation requirements.48 A sub­
42. /d. at 1294. 
43. The Commission has issued 24 litigated orders and 132 consent orders. 
Request, supra note 17, at 10471. 
44. See infra notes 107-34 and accompanying text. 
45. 16 C.F.R. § 233.1(a) (1986). 
46. 16 C.F.R. § 233.3(e) (1986). 
47. 16 C.F.R. § 436. 1 (c)(2) (1978). 
48. See, e.g., WIS. § 100.21(2)(a) (West Supp. 1983) (no person may make energy 
savings claim without reasonable and currently accepted scientific basis for claim when 
claim is made; making energy savings or safety claim without reasonable and currently 
accepted scientific basis is unfair method of competition); Conn. Dept. of Consumer 
Protection Reg. § 42-110b-28(b)(l7) (1977) (new and used car dealers are required to 
have reasonable belief in truth of their representations and sufficient information upon 
which that belief can be based); La. Public Health & Safety Reg. § 6l7(A)(I) (1978) 
(requires representations concerning effect of drugs or devices to be supported by 
demonstrable scientific facts); Wis. Trans. § 139.03(2) (1983) (Automobile dealers who 
make representations "concerning the motor vehicles it offers for sale, the services it 
provides or other aspects of its business operation, shall possess detailed evidence of the 
validity and accuracy thereof, which evidence shall be furnished ... upon request."). 
The statutes of a number of states explicitly state that courts should look to Federal 
Trade Commission decisions and policies for guidance. See. e.g., ALASKA STAT. 
§ 45.50:545 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501-204(2) (West Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAws 
ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(b) (Law Co-op 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-2(4) (1983). These 
states could find, therefore, that the failure to have a reasonable basis for advertising 
claims is a violation of their state deceptive practices acts. There are, however, no 
10 CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 55 
stantiation requirement conceivably could be read into section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act, which provides competitors with a remedy for 
deceptive advertising,49 A number of advertising agencies and the 
major television networks have advertising review policies of their 
own.50 These policies are an effort to avoid network or agency lia­
bility for deceptive advertising and, at least in the case of networks, 
to keep the peace with clients who compete with one another.51 
reported cases so holding. A number of state attorneys general do assume that a 
reasonable basis requirement is part of their states' law. See, e.g., Letter of Allen C. 
Hoberg, North Dakota Assistant Attorney General, to Charles Shafer (Feb. 10, 1984); 
Letter of Curt Loewe, Minnesota Consumer Services Unit, to Charles Shafer (Feb. 9, 
1984) (Commission regulations regarding advertising substantiation are cited in suits 
brought under Minnesota's Consumer Fraud Statute); Letter of Paul C. Douglas, 
Nebraska Attorney General, to Charles Shafer (Feb. 9, 1984) (attempts to convince 
courts that advertiser's inability to substantiate claim is unfair or deceptive act in itself); 
Letter of Frank]. Kelley, Michigan Attorney General, to Charles Shafer (Feb. 6, 1984) 
(while statute does not specifically require substantiation, as practical matter, in non­
judicial resolution of problems substantiation of claims becomes issue). 
49. The statute provides that: 
Any person who shall affix, apply or annex, or use in connection with 
any goods or services, . . . a false designation of origin, or any false 
description or representation, ... shall be liable to a civil action ... by 
any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of 
any false description or representation. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Two cases have addressed the issue. In Johnson &Johnson 
v. Quality Pure Mfg., 484 F. Supp. 975 (D.NJ. 1979), a television commercial was chal­
lenged because it claimed that the defendant's shampoo had the same characteristics as 
the plaintiff's shampoo. The plaintiff charged that the defendant "lacked a fact founda­
tion" for the claim. The court stated it was "satisfied that [the statute] provides a private 
cause of action to enjoin such advertising when the defendant has made the claim with­
out a good faith basis, grounded on substantial pre-existing proof, to support it." [d. at 
983. However, in Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241 (D. Del. 1980), the court 
held that it could not accept Toro's argument that it is entitled to prevail on a claim 
under § 43(a) simply by showing that a defendant's advertising claim was unsubstanti­
ated. The plain language of § 43(a), which prohibits false rather than unsubstantiated 
representations, requires that a plaintiff establish not merely that defendant's claim lack 
substantiation but also that it is false or deceptive. ld. at 253. 
50. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Company, Remarks in Response to the FTC's 
Request for Comments about the Advertising Substantiation Program 3 (undated) 
(Commission's Request available in 48 Fed. Reg. 10471) [hereinafter cited as NBC] 
(Broadcast Standards Department started in 1934); CBS, Inc., Remarks in Response to 
the FTC's Request for Comments about the Advertising Substantiation Program 2 (July 
15, 1983) (Commission's Request available in 48 Fed. Reg. 10471) [hereinafter cited as 
CBS] (Department of Program Practices established in 1959). The advertising agencies 
currently sponsor the National Advertising Review Board. There are a variety of other 
associations, model codes, and standards committees which can be traced back to the 
early 1910's. 119 CONGo REC. 11527, 11528 (1973) (Statement of Sen. Moss). 
5l. See, e.g., CBS, supra note 50, at 2 (emphasizing that network does not want to be 
viewed as uquasi enforcement agency"); NBC, supra note 50, at 18 (substantiation 
program is part of their effort to mediate challenges of one sponsor's advertisements by 
another). With regard to the liability of advertising agencies, see, e.g., Porter & Dietsch 
v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980) (considers 
agency's knowing participation in deception); Ogilvy & Mather InCI, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 1, 
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The Commission also has made advertising substantiation re­
quirements part of cease and desist orders where the advertiser has 
been found guilty of deception. Often this is done under the theory 
that the Commission may "fence in" advertisers who have engaged 
in deceptive practices and who the Commission fears will find some 
way of evading an order which merely requires the advertisers to 
cease engaging in the deceptive conduct found to have occurred. 
For example, in Tashof v. FTC, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit approved a requirement that a seller of eye­
glasses refrain from selling any merchandise at a "discount" price 
unless it first takes a "statistically significant survey" that shows the 
prevailing price is "substantially" higher than its price. 52 Because 
the Commission commonly includes in all complaints filed under 
§ 5 of the FTCA allegations that claims are both untrue and unsub­
stantiated, this writer has difficulty distinguishing "deception" and 
"substantiation" cases.53 
In 1983 the Commission requested all interested parties to submit 
comments on a variety of questions regarding the advertising sub­
stantiation program. 54 A number ofmanufacturers, retailers, adver­
tising agencies, television networks, and other parties submitted 
comments on the program. After reviewing those comments, the 
Commission issued a policy statement revising some aspects of the 
program.55 The Commission formally abandoned resort to 
15 (1983) (agency is liable for deceptive claims; claims must be substantiated but agency 
may rely on expert judgment of client); McCaffrey & McCall, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 367, 369 
(1983) (agency must obtain substantiation for all claims; no permission to rely on 
client's judgment). 
52. 437 F.2d 707, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Camp Chevrolet, 84 F.R.C. 648 
(1974) (order required substantiation by competent scientific tests because 
manufacturer had made false claims regarding nature of tests shown television 
audience). 
53. A review of all advertising cases beginning with Volume 100 of FTC Reports 
shows that all cases with a substantiation charge also have a charge that the claim is 
untrue. Only five cases involving untruth do not have a charge of lack of substantiation. 
See Kimberly Int'l, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,282 (Aug. 19, 1985); Jim Clark's Beef, 
Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,013 (May 3, 1983); Encyclopedia Britanica, Inc., 100 
F.T.C. 500 (1982); Nat'l Ass'n of Scuba Diving Schools, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 439 (1982); 
American Motors Corp., 100 F.T.C. 229 (1982). 
The Commission's rationale is particularly difficult to ascertain because every case 
since 1982 involved a consent order, except for the over-the-counter analgesic cases 
discussed in this article. Therefore, no facts are presented other than those that can be 
gleaned from the complaint. 
54. Request, supra note 17. The Summary of the Commission staff's review of the 
comments is included in ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION PROGRAM, ANALYSIS OF PuBLIC 
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDED CHANGES ijuly 23, 1984). 
55. SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19; Remarks of William Miller III, 
Chairman, FTC on FTC's Ad Substantiation Program 3 (Wash. D.C., March 23, 1984) 
[hereinafter cited as Miller]. William Miller III was President Reagan's first appointee as 
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"rounds" as a device for determining whether advertisers have sub­
stantiation. Hence, the Commission will question all advertisers on 
an individual basis and will not make the nature of investigations 
public.56 The Commission reiterated the policy of requiring sub­
stantiation prior to making products claims.57 The Commission de­
cided that post claim substantiation should be considered in 
determining the public interest58 in proceeding against an adver­
tiser, evaluating the adequacy of pre-claim substantiation, and fash­
ioning an appropriate remedy.59 
III. JUSTIFICATION 
A. Deception 
To evaluate Commission policy and to resolve issues arIsmg 
under the advertising substantiation program, it is important to first 
clearly articulate the justification for substantiation requirements. 
Despite the fact that substantiation policies have received considera­
ble attention, there has not been a clear understanding of the role 
advertising substantiation plays in the Commission's fight against 
deceptive advertising. Commission cases devote little space to set­
ting forth the connection between the failure to have a prescribed 
level of substantiation for claims and the prevention of unfair or de­
ceptive advertising. In the Commission's most recent policy state­
ment on the substantiation program, the only attempt to clarify the 
underlying rationale of the substantiation requirement is the Com­
mission's reasoning that false claims of substantiation are proof that 
a claim is "material."60 However, that does not justify a substantia­
tion requirement that is independent of a requirement that the ad­
vertising claims be true. Moreover, an advertiser may make an 
unsubstantiated claim because the advertiser does not believe the 
claim is material, such as the type of claim considered "puffing." A 
good deal of the difficulty in articulating the standard to be applied 
can be traced to this failure to clarify the goals of the program. 
There are two ways in which the requirement that advertisers pos-
Chairman of the Commission. He has recently been named Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget. 
56. SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 6. 
57. !d. at 7. 
58. The FTCA requires that Commission action be brought in the public interest. 
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982). 
59. SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 6. 
60. "[C]onsumers would be less likely to rely on claims for products or services if 
they knew the advertisers did not have a reasonable basis." SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, 
supra note 19, at 2. 
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sess adequate substantiation is significant in combatting deceptive 
advertising. 
First, expressed or implied claims of substantiation are significant 
to consumers because they relate to the likelihood that a claim is 
true. It may be difficult or impossible to determine whether many 
claims are or are not in fact true.61 For example, many personal 
computers are sold with the claim that they will be of benefit to a 
child's ability to compete in school or to succeed in later life.62 Be­
cause we cannot be sure of our ability to predict the future, it is 
probably impossible to determine whether such claims are true. 
Some claims may be susceptible to reasonably objective proof, but 
the results will vary from consumer to consumer. For example, a 
pain reliever may work faster for particular types of pain or particu­
lar consumers. No consumer could know without trying such a 
product how it will perform. 
Finally, claims may be difficult or impossible for consumers to 
evaluate even after purchase. Comparative product claims may not 
be subject to evaluation unless the consumer engages in extensive 
testing, which.is virtually impossible. In all of the above situations, 
consumers realize that there is no way to be sufe if claims are "true" 
or "false." Consumers understand that they are taking a risk.63 Yet 
the above situations represent those in which deception is most 
likely.64 When consumers believe that advertisers have tested prod­
61. In FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, MEMORANDUM, ADVERTISING 
SUBSTANTIATION 15-18 (Nov. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as MEMORANDUM], it is argued 
that consumers are deceived when a purchased product has a smaller likelihood of 
success than they thought. 
Consumers will not necessarily assume that the advertised outcome will occur with 
certainty. Support claims are valuable because they give consumers a basis for 
estimating the chances that they will actually receive the advertised benefit. !d. at 4. 
62. See, e.g., Ally Execs Derail Commodore Criticism, ADVERTISING AGE, October 31, 1983, 
at 64; T I Takes Education Track, ADVERTISING AGE, October 3, 1983, at 1; Galanter, 
Honing in on Computers, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, September, 1984, at 30. 
63. To the extent that consumers do not understand that a risk is being taken, we 
could conclude that the advertising has convinced consumers that there is an extremely 
high probability that the advertising claims will prove true. 
64. One line of thought which might suggest where deception occurs began with 
Philip Nelson, who divided goods into search and experience goods. Nelson, Advertising 
as lriformation, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Advertising]; Nelson, 
Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
lriformation]. Goods which consumers prefer to investigate before purchasing are search 
goods. lriformation, supra at 372. Nelson gives the contrasting examples of canned tuna 
and a dress. A consumer cannot tell much about the tuna before purchase. Therefore, 
it is an experience good. A consumer can, however, examine a dress thoroughly before 
purchasing. Nelson states that advertising for search goods often provides direct 
information about the product. The most important information conveyed about 
experience goods "is simply that the brand advertises." Advertising, supra at 730. Nelson 
states that "the major control that consumers have over the market for experience 
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ucts prior to making claims, they believe that the products more 
likely will perform as advertised. In this way, the advertising sub­
stantiation doctrine is a specialized form of Commission action 
against deceptive implied claims in advertising. The implied claims 
concern the likelihood that a particular statement is true. 
This justification of the advertising substantiation doctrine is re­
lated to Commission action regarding the use of testimonials and 
endorsements in advertising.65 In 1975, the Commission adopted 
an industry guide regarding the use of endorsements and testimoni­
als.66 The Commission requires that endorsements reflect the hon­
qualities is whether they repeat the purchase of a brand or not." !d. The conclusion he 
reaches is that it is not necessary to have any legal protection for misleading advertising. 
In the case of search goods, consumers can conduct an adequate inspection and, in the 
case of experience goods consumers, should expect to need to test out the product. !d. 
at 741. In fact, he suggests that advertising regulation may be counterproductive 
because it will cause people to have an unreasonably high expectation for truthfulness in 
advertising. !d. at 750. 
Two refinements of Nelson's work are relevant here. One involves adding a new 
category: credence goods. The other involves recognizing search, experience, and 
credence qualities in all goods. The concept ofcredence goods is contrasted with search 
and experience goods. See Darby & Kami, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount ofFraud, 
16 J. L. & ECON. 67 (1973). Whereas the value of some goods can be ascertained by the 
search process before purchase or by experience after purchase, the value of some 
goods cannot be ascertained by the normal consumer at all. The example given is an 
automobile repair shop. Often a customer must rely on the word of the repair shop that 
a given part is needed and that it works well. The market for credence goods is one in 
which fraud is more likely. The writers suggests a variety of factors which would make 
fraud less likely, e.g., where the seller is operating at capacity, where the seller expects a 
long term relationship with the buyer which would be harmed if the fraud were 
uncovered, and where there is a warranty of some sort. [d. at 76. 
These concepts are made more helpful to us by recognizing that they represent 
qualities which can be present in all goods and that they represent relative points on a 
continuum rather than discrete qualities. See Jordan & Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the 
Law of False Advertising, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 527, 531 (1979). Jordan and Rubin point out 
that as qualities in goods move along the continuum from search to credence the 
likelihood of fraud increases. [d. at 531. It is more likely, then, that there will be fraud 
to the extent that advertising messages contain claims that consumers never practically 
can evaluate, such as the speed of headache remedies, the likelihood of future 
conditions, and the importance that a particular product plays in the success of an 
athlete. See, e.g., American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681,698 (3d Cir. 1983) 
("Because consumers cannot accurately rate the products for themselves, advertising, 
and the expectations which it engenders, becomes a significantly more influential source 
of consumer beliefs than it would otherwise."). This may be a way of saying that the 
most deceptive messages would be those that focus on the "credence" qualities that are 
present in all commodities. Joskow, Comments on Peltzman, 24 J. L. & ECON. 403, 450 
(1981). 
65. See, e.g., Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 303 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980) (presentation of testimonials implies that typical users 
experience same results). 
66. 16 C.F.R. § 255 (1985). Industry guides were adopted prior to the clear 
statutory grant of rulemaking power. Violation of a guideline does not have the same 
consequences as violation of a rule. 
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est opinions of the endorser and that an endorser's qualifications be 
as represented.67 For example, in 1937 the Commission proceeded 
against an encyclopedia publisher for falsely claiming testimonials 
for its publication.68 While a consumer is concerned with how use­
ful an encyclopedia will be, rather than with who likes the encyclo­
pedia, the consumer realizes that at the time of purchase he or she 
can make a judgment regarding only the likelihood that the product 
will serve the purpose for which it is purchased. The endorsements 
persuade the consumer in making that judgment. The regulation of 
the truth or falsity of statements is not of direct concern to consum­
ers. The regulation of testimonials and endorsements is, therefore, 
not the regulation of the truth or falsity of statements, but the regu­
lation of implied claims regarding the likelihood that product qual­
ity claims are true. 
A second theoretical basis for the advertising substantiation pro­
gram is that it is part of the Commission's effort to attack conduct of 
advertisers which may not necessarily involve actual misstatements 
about a particular product, but which, if allowed, would create an 
environment in which a significant amount of misstatements are 
likely to be made. Essentially the rationale is as follows: If one 
makes claims without knowing whether they are true or false, it is 
more likely that the claims will be false than if one only makes claims 
on the basis of relevant information regarding the product. In this 
regard the truth or falsity of a particular claim is not relevant. Even 
if the claim is true, the advertiser has engaged in a deceptive prac­
tice, if the advertiser has failed to test the claim before disseminat­
ing it. Hence, the purpose of the program is to achieve a higher 
level of accuracy in all advertisements by compelling sellers to con­
duct better testing of potential claims.69 The FTCA comprehends 
67. 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.1 (a), 255.3(a) (1985). 
68. ITC v. Standard Educ. Soc., 302 U.S. 112 (1937); see also Hall & Ruchel, Inc., 32 
F.T.C. 229 (1940) (representations that product endorsed by physicians and scientists 
were false). 
69. Robert Pitofsky has stated: 
[I]f the advertising substantiation rule is justifiable at all, it is for 
reasons not touched upon in Commission opinions. A prior 
substantiation rule should trigger a process of advertising review ... which 
should help to eliminate or curtail the quantity of inaccurate information 
in the market place. Enthusiastic marketing people would no longer be 
able to put off demands for substantiation with the response that the data 
will be made available when and if needed but would have to accumulate 
substantiating evidence before making the claim. 
Pitofsky, Advertising Re{fUlation and the Consumer Movement, in ISSUES IN ADVERTISING: THE 
ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION 27, 36 (D. Tuerck ed. 1978). 
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such a policy by proscribing "deceptive" acts as opposed to merely 
proscribing"deception." 
It is also important to emphasize that in this context, consumer 
expectations with regard to the amount of substantiation are not rel­
evant. Regardless of the amount of substantiation consumers ex­
pect advertisers to have, the Commission is making an independent 
judgment of the amount of substantiation sellers making particular 
kinds of claims should have. Proscription of industry practices that 
may lead to deception can be found in a number of Commission ac­
tions. For example, in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., the court held 
that it was a deceptive trade practice to represent that a televised 
demonstration provided visual proof of a product claim when the 
televised demonstration did not do so, even if the claim itself was 
true.70 Colgate television advertisements claimed to show that 
"Rapid Shave" shaving cream enabled a razor to shave sandpaper. 
Actually, in the televised demonstration, the substance that ap­
peared to be sandpaper was a simulated paper made of plexiglass to 
which sand had been applied. Although the product actually could 
shave sandpaper, if real sandpaper h~d been used it would have ap­
peared to television viewers as just plain paper.71 Additionally, the 
mock-up allowed a shorter time span between application and shav­
ing than did the sand paper. The court and the Commission had 
difficulty articulating the harm. Although there was an implicit lie 
(i.e., "what you are seeing is sandpaper being shaven"), viewers 
probably would not have been concerned that the demonstration 
was actually that of sandpaper being shaven as long as the product 
could perform as claimed.72 Therefore, the lie did not harm con­
sumers in that instance. Rather, the decision can be seen as based 
on fears regarding the power of television advertising to deceive 
people. One way to guard against that risk would be to have a firm, 
clear rule that viewers should always be informed when there is any 
kind of simulation.73 
70. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965). 
71. /d. at 376-77. 
72. This assumes that viewers care that they would have been able to shave 
sandpaper. 
73. Robert Pitofsky defends the Colgate decision on the ground that the issues which 
a "mock-up defense" would generate "may tend to complicate and lengthen an 
otherwise simple fraudulent demonstration case." Pitofsky, supra note 69, at 69l. This 
theory may be the same as that presented in the text. The theory defends a finding of 
deception on the basis that if the conduct were allowed, proving deception would be too 
difficult. Phony "mock-ups" have not been pursued by the Commission since Colgate. 
[d. at 692. Another case which illustrates this concept of deception involved 
misrepresentation regarding a gasoline additive. The use of language like "Here's 
proof" and "You're about to see proof" and the appearance in the demonstration of 
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Another example of proscription of industry practices that may 
lead to deception is seen in the Commission's Vocational School 
Rule, which, inter alia, required proprietary vocational and home 
study schools to provide pro rata refunds to students who withdrew 
from their courses.74 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit partially invalidated the rule because the penalties 
were not to be based on specific misstatements by the schools.75 
The court invalidated the refund and job placement provisions of 
the rule.76 The court was in essence unable to see a non pro-rata 
refund policy as deceptive. However, it can be viewed as deceptive 
in the sense discussed above. The Commission was concerned 
about a multitude of deceptive statements, each of which would be 
difficult to detect and proscribe with sufficient clarity. Moreover, to 
enforce a proscription of each individual deceptive statement would 
require constant monitoring by the Commission. 77 The pro-rata re­
fund provision, therefore, placed the risk on the school that stu­
complicated measuring instruments and white-coated technicians contributed to an 
impression that. scientific testing was behind the advertising. Yet the televised 
demonstration far exceeded the actual effects of the additive. Although there was no 
proof that the additive could not fulfill the claims, the court concluded that the conduct 
was deceptive. Here again the Commission apparently was most concerned that the 
unchecked use of the television medium would make the presence ofuntrue claims more 
likely. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1472 (1974). 
74. 16 C.F.R. § 438.4 (1984). The rule also provided that schools must provide 
information to prospective students concerning the schools' graduation and placement 
records. The rule extended the "cooling off period" on vocational school enrollments 
contracts to fourteen days. ld. at 438.3. See Vocational Schools Trade Regulation Rule 
Statement of Basis and Purpose, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,796 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Vocational Statement]. 
75. Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 664 (2d Cir. 1979). 
76. /d. at 662-65. The court invalidated the refund and job placement provision of 
the rule. The court objected to that provision on two grounds. First, the court stated 
that the Commission had not defined with adequate specificity the unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices which the provision prevented. /d. at 662. (The statutory provision 
requiring that the deceptive act be stated with specificity is at 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(1)(B) 
(1982». The court held that the statutory requirement of specific definition of the 
deceptive acts "would be meaningless if the only unfair acts or practices defined in the 
rule were possible future violations of [the Commission'S] remedial requirements." ld.. 
Second, the court rejected the Commission's position that the rule was intended to 
combat a variety of deceptive practices because the rule "penalizes every vocational 
school for every student" dropout regardless of the reason for dropping out. The court 
held that there was "no rational connection between the Commission's universally 
applicable refund requirements and the prevention of specifically described unfair and 
deceptive enrollment practices." ld. at 664. 
77. The Commission found that: 
Among the most prevalent of such misrepresentations are exaggerated 
or false statements concerning a school's equipment and facilities; the 
quality of instruction provided; the availability of part-time employment 
opportunities during the course; refund policy provisions; and 
accreditations and government approval of courses. 
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dents would discover after beginning courses that the school was 
not for them. This would be an incentive for the school to be as 
truthful as possible. 78 
The courts' restricted reading of the FTCA's requirements with 
regard to trade regulation rules stems from the failure of the court 
to recognize that the absence of the procedures mandated by the 
Commission was "deceptive," because that absence tended to in­
duce deception even though the absence of the procedures is not in 
and of itself deception. Moreover, many Commission rules had al­
ready set out required conduct, the absence ofwhich would not nec­
essarily constitute deception.79 
B. Unfairness 
The FTCA prohibits unfair as well as deceptive acts and prac­
tices.so In fact, the first case to set forth the "reasonable basis" doc­
trine was premised on the concept of unfairness and not 
deceptiveness.81 Subsequent cases, however, have grounded sub­
stantiation requirements in deception or have suggested that "un­
fairness" and "deception" are interchangeable.82 Both a recent 
Two additional types of misrepresentations have a particularly serious 
impact on the prospective enrollee's ability to make a rational purchase 
decision. First, schools often dissuade students from reflecting on their 
decision to enroll by falsely claiming that rigid enrollment deadlines 
exist.... 
Second, schools have misrepresented the selectivity of their admissions 
process through false claims about the use of an admissions screening 
committee. 
Vocational Statement, supra note 74, at 60,799. 
78. Gibbs, 612 F.2d at 663. 678. "No longer will schools be able to derive any 
significant financial benefit from engaging in unfair or deceptive enrollment practices." 
Vocational Statement, supra note 74, at 60,799. 
79. For example, advertisements providing care information that does not meet the 
specific requirements of 16 C.F.R. § 423 (1985) (Care Labeling of Textile Wearing 
Apparel) would not be deceptive in the sense of conveying misleading information; 
however, they would be deceptive in the sense of violating the FTCA. 
80. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). At times the Commission has labeled conduct as either 
"unfair" or "deceptive." Usually, however, the Commission describes conduct as either 
unfair or deceptive and leaves it at that. 
81. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972). In Pfizer, the Commission suggested that 
the advertising was unfair because it was more economically efficient to require 
advertisers, rather than consumers, to test claims. 
82. See, e.g., Stihl, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 840, 843 (1983) (complaint alleged advertising 
practices constituted unfair and deceptive acts). But see Porter & Dietsch v. FTC, 605 
F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980) (substantiation requirements 
grounded only in deception). The Commission seems to believe that there is no 
distinction between the two: 
The application of the "reasonable basis" test, based on deception, is 
to be distinguished from the Commission's review of the question of 
advertising substantiation in the context of our recent decision in Pfizer, 
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Commission decision and a recent Commission policy statement 
suggest a return to "unfairness" as a theoretical basis for the 
program.83 
However, because both of the justifications for a reasonable basis 
requirement involve the Commission's authority to proceed against 
"deceptive" practices, there is no need to ground the policy in the 
Commission's authority over "unfair" practices. It is important to 
establish that basing the program on unfairness does not aid injusti­
fying Commission action. This is due to the less than successful 
struggle on the part of the Commission and the courts to give mean­
ing to the word "unfair." In 1964 the Commission proposed the 
following definition: 
[T]he factors that determine whether a particular act or 
practice should be forbidden [as unfair] are as follows: (1) 
whether the practice, without necessarily having been previ­
ously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been 
established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise­
whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of 
some common law, statutory, or other established concept of 
unfairness;' (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to con­
sumers (or competitors or other businessmen).84 
This standard was once cited favorably by the United States 
Supreme Court.85 The Commission has proposed other standards 
for identifying unfairness, including one in 1978 which appeared to 
Inc. . . . There we considered the impact of unsubstantiated, affinnative 
product claims as a matter of marketplace fairness; our decision was 
grounded exclusively on the unfairness . . . . Whether an advertisement is 
analyzed from the standpoint of unfairness Qr deception, however. the standard for 
evaluating the substantiating material and test which is applied is the same-does 
the substantiation provide a reasonable basis to support the claim. 
National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 550 n.10 (1973), modified, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974) (emphasis added). 
It is not clear whether National Dynamics represents a departure from the economic 
efficiency justification as a basis for the Pfizer court's finding of unfairness. 
83. See Substantiation Statement, supra note 19; see also Thompson Medical Co., 104 
F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984). 
84. Cigarette Rule Statement of Basis & Purpose, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8354-55 
(1964). 
85. FTC v. Speery & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,244 n. 5 (1972). The Comission 
has paraphrased the three factors that it considers in applying the unfairness prohibition 
as; "(1) whether the practice injures consumers; (2) whether it violates established 
public policy; (3) whether it is unethical or unscrupulous." Letter of the FTC to 
Senators Wendell Ford and John Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in FTC Act 
Amendments and Authorization, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 598, at 35 (May 31, 1983) 
[hereinafter cited as Letter J. 
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retreat from the second set of factors listed above. The restated test 
was: 
(1) Whether the acts or practices result in substantial harm 
to consumers. In making this determination both the eco­
nomic and social benefits and the losses flowing from the chal­
lenged conduct must be assessed, and (2) Whether the 
challenged conduct offends public policy.86 
In a recent response to a Congressional inquiry regarding the pa­
rameters of the unfairness concept, the Commission set forth a se­
ries of considerations which more closely paralleled the standards 
set forth in 1964. The Commission stated that the most important 
criteria was "unjustified consumer injury."87 Such injury must be 
substantial; it "must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer 
or competitive benefits that the sales practice also produces, and it 
"must be [an injury] which consumers could not reasonably have 
avoided."88 
One writer has surveyed Commission unfairness cases in an effort 
to develop some guides as to where the Commission is likely to find 
unfairness.89 His survey suggests t,hat the standard is used when 
there is some harm other than untruthfulness and most often when 
there is some activity which prevents efficiency in the market 
place.90 He concludes by agreeing with the United States Supreme 
Court that the term unfair "does not admit of precise definition" 
86. Advertising of Opthalmic Goods and Services, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 
43 Fed. Reg. 23992, 24000-01 (1978). 
87. Letter, supra note 85, at 35. 
88. !d. at 36-37. The standard is obviously economic (cost/benefit) in nature, but 
with perplexing use of words like "substanti~r' and "reasonably." The Commission 
implies that even if the injury outweighs the benefits of not preventing it, there might be 
Commission inaction if the injury is not substantial or if the consumer has not acted 
reasonably, the substantialness and reasonableness to be judged by some other criteria. 
Those other criteria are not set out. 
89. Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission 
(198]),81 WIS. L. REV. 107 (1981). 
90. For example, the withholding ofmaterial information might be unfair if the "lack 
of easily obtainable comparative information had eliminated sellers' incentives to 
compete by offering a better grade of product." !d. at 117. 
One example given is the Commission's requiring manufacturers and distributers of 
insulation material to determine and publicize the "R-Value," That was necessary 
because 
it would be prohibitively expensive for consumers to measure or observe 
the effectiveness of different brands of insulation on their own. At the 
same time, no seller had sufficient incentive to provide the information 
because it would first have to bear the entire expense of educating 
consumers as to the significance of the R-Value, an expense which would 
later benefit other firms as well. 
Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 44 Fed. 
Reg. 5018, 5022 (1979). 
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and that its meaning must be arrived at by "the gradual process of 
judicial inclusion and exclusion."91 Many other people have made 
similar statements when attempting to give the term some mean­
ing.92 In fact, even the Commission, attempting to convince Con­
gress that the term had some definable meaning (at least in 
application), began its discussion conceding that the term itself 
gives little guidance as to its meaning, but arguing that Congress 
understood this when it intentionally selected the term.93 
Congress may change its mind. Concern about the inability to 
arrive at a comprehensible definition of "unfair" has led to criticism 
that the term is too vague and that, therefore, the Commission's ap­
plication of it may be too unpredictable.94 Congress has, for exam­
ple, restricted the use of the regulation of advertising directed at 
children on the basis of unfairness95 and has flirted with the idea of 
prohibiting all regulation of advertising on the basis of unfairness,96 
including prohibiting a statutory definition of unfairness.97 
Another example of conduct which does not involve untruthfulness, but which is 
wrong, because it prohibits the efficient operation ofmarkets or because it violates some 
other standard of propriety, is conduct which restricts consumers' post-purchase rights. 
Craswell, supra note 89, at 131. 
91. !d. at 153 (quoting FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643. 648 (1931». 
92. HIn the twelve years since the Court's ruling in S & H, the FTC has not clarified 
the meaning of the unfairness standard by carefully documented studies or thoughtful 
explanations of why particular practices are unfair to consumers." Gellhorn, Trading 
Stamps, S & H, and the FTC's Unfairrtess Doctrine, 1983 DUKE LJ. 903 (1983). 
93. Letter, supra note 85, at 34-35. See, e.g., All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc., 75 F.T.C. 
465, 490 (1969). 
94. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization 1983, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House Committee on Energy & 
Commerce, 98th Cong., lst Sess., 14, 18,22,23,27 (1983) (Statements ofJames C. Miller 
III, David A. Clanton, and Patricia P. Bailey) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; FTC 
Amendments & Authorizations, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 598, at 5 (May 31, 1983); FTC 
Act Amendments, [1982] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 545, at 16, 51 (June 7, 1982); FTC 
Act Amendments, [1982] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 561, at 13 (Sept. 27, 1982); 
Craswell, supra note 89, at 3 n. 7. 
95. Section II (a) of the 1980 FTC Improvement Act prevents the Commission from 
promulgating any rule regarding children's advertising on the basis of unfairness. 
Federal Trade Commission Authorization, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 436, at 6 (May 6, 
1980). The amendment is now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57c (1982). 
96. In 1982. the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
proposed that § 5 be amended to provide that, H[T]he Commission shall have no 
authority ... to prohibit or otherwise regulate any commercial advertising on the basis of a 
determination by the Commission that such commercial advertising constitutes an unfair 
act or practice in or affecting commerce." FTC Act Amendments [1982] TRADE REG. REP. 
(CCH) No. 545, at 34 (June 7, 1982) (emphasis added). 
97. In 1982 and 1983, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce proposed 
the following definition of unfairness: 
An act or practice in or affecting commerce shall be considered to be 
an unfair act or practice . . . if 
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The nebulousness of the concept of unfairness results from the 
lack of an indication of the harm or the type of conduct at which it is 
directed. Despite the difficulty in achieving precision in defining 
"deception," that basis for an action at least identifies the nature of 
the harm it seeks to avoid (i.e., people having incorrect information) 
and the nature of the conduct it seeks to prohibit (i.e., communica­
tions which convey incorrect information). Where the standard the 
Commission uses is nebulous, it is politically easier to attack actions 
based on that standard. To adequately protect consumers, Congress 
may have to resort to such an indeterminate word through which 
diverse harms can be attacked.98 The Commission need not rely on 
"unfairness" for support of the advertising substantiation doc­
trine,99 because the program in all of its phases deals with the prob­
(i) such act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury 
to consumers, and 
(ii) such substantial irtiury (1) is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers; and (II) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition which result from such act or practice. 
Any determination under the precedi.ng sentence regarding whether an 
act or practice is an unfair act or practice shall take into account, in 
addition to other relevant factors, whether such act or practice violates 
any public policy as established by Federal or State statutes, common law, 
practices in business or industry, or otherwise. This subparagraph shall 
not have any force or effect, and shall not be taken into account, in 
connection with the enforcement of any State law which prevents 
persons, partnerships or corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the 
State from engaging in unfair acts or practices. 
FTC Amendments & Authorizations, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 598, at 5 (May 31, 
1983); FTC Act Amendments [1982J TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 561, at 19 (Sept. 17, 
1982). 
In 1982, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation proposed 
the following definition: 
[Ulnfair acts or practices are acts or practices that have caused or are 
likely to cause substantial il'\jury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by counter­
vailing benefits to consumers or competition. 
FTC Act Amendments [1982] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 561, at 79 (Sept. 17, 1982). 
Congressional opposition to action based on the concept of unfairness may be moti­
vated by concerns about the specific interests that are threatened by the Commission. 
The concern about unfairness is being expressed at the same time that a large number 
of special interests are seeking and receiving Congressional protection from the Com­
mission. See, e.g., S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA 159-69 (1983); M. 
PERTSCHUCK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION 69-117 (1982). 
98. See, e.g., FTC Act Amendments &Authorizations, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), No. 598, at 
42 (May 31,1983). An example ofa type of practice which may be unfair but could not 
be considered deceptive involved including free samples of razor blades in advertising 
supplements to home delivered newspapers, without any protective packaging that 
would keep children from using them. Philip Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16 (1973). 
99. The Commission in Pfizer, Inc., concluded that advertising without a reasonable 
basis is unfair. The Commission based its conclusion on an economic analysis, 
reasoning that it is often more efficient for sellers to test claims than for consumers to 
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lem of incorrect consumer information, as established above.lOo 
First, the advertising substantiation doctrine does involve untruthful 
statements, albeit often implied, that advertisers have information 
they do not in fact have, and that an advertising claim is being made 
with a certain degree of confidence. lol Second, the doctrine in­
volves conduct which makes untrue statements more likely to occur. 
It is therefore unnecessary, and may be counterproductive, to dis­
cuss advertising substantiation in terms of unfairness, a vague and 
often ill-favored concept. 
C. Summary: "DeceptiveS and DeceptiveP" 
There are two justifications for characterizing many unsubstanti­
ated claims as deceptive. The first involves an express or implied 
misstatement regarding the truth of a claim. For the balance of this 
article, "deceptive" in this sense will be denominated "deceptive'" 
(the "s" standing for "statement"). The second justification in­
volves conduct that is likely to lead to deception. For the balance of 
this article, "deceptive" in this sense will be denominated "decep­
tiveP" (for deceptive practice). 
IV. THE REQUIRED LEVEL OF SUBSTANTIATION 
A. Confusing Standards 
Since unveiling the substantiation doctrine, the Commission has 
not clearly articulated how much substantiation should be required 
of advertisers. Although the Commission generally has recognized 
that the same level of precision may not be appropriate for all claims 
for all products, there has been considerable discussion of what fac­
tors should affect the decision regarding the level of substantiation 
required in particular circumstances. Pfizer, Inc. established the gen­
eral principle that advertisers should have a "reasonable basis" for 
their claims. 102 Other cases have referred to the "amount of sub­
stantiation which would satisfy a reasonably prudent business-
test claims, and that consumers take an economic gamble when they purchase products 
where the seller has not confirmed claims. 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972). The concern for 
efficiency is dealt with in the definitions of "deceptive" presented earlier. See supra notes 
66-67 and accompanying text. 
100. In recent discussions of the advertising substantiation program, Chairman Miller 
has spoken only in terms of deceptiveness. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 55. 
10l. This article acknowledges that the falsity of the express or implied statement 
regarding substantiation is not the ultimate issue in a § 5 action. 
102. 81 F.T.C. 23, 73 (1972). 
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man;"103 "tests or surveys using statistically valid methodology;"I04 
or "competent and objective" material. 105 
The lack of clarity as to what is required to satisfy the advertising 
substantiation requirement has been described as "reasonable basis 
turmoil," with "the extent of a manufacturer's obligation to sub­
stantiate its advertisements ... unclear," and replete with "confu­
sion, inconsistencies, and overall unpredictability."lo6 
The area in which the Commission has labored the most to de­
velop advertising substantiation standards involves over-the­
counter analgesics. In Pfizer, the Commission rejected the proposi­
tion that "the only reasonable basis for performance or effectiveness 
representations for a drug or medical product would be fully docu­
mented, adequate, and well-controlled scientific studies."lo7 The 
Commission would have accepted medical literature, clinical experi­
ence, or general medical knowledge as a reasonable basis. lOS How­
ever, the Commission set out the following factors which affect the 
level of substantiation required: 
(1) the type and specificity of the claim made-e.g., safety, 
efficacy, dietary, health, medical; (2) the type ofproduct~.g., 
food, drug, potentially hazardous consumer product, other 
consumer product; (3) the possible consequences of a false 
103. National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973), modified, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974). 
104. Camp Chevrolet, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 648, 652 (1974). 
105. Jay Norris, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 989, 1015 (1978), modified, 598 F.2d 1244, 1253 (2d 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979). In Norris, the Commission had set forth the 
following requirement: 
[Advertisers must base their claims on] competent and reliable 
scientific tests . . . in which one or more persons with education, 
knowledge and experience in the field conduct a test and evaluate its 
results in an objective manner using testimony, evaluation and analysis 
procedures accepted in the profession ... [and which] accurately predict 
... the results that a consumer ordinarily would obtain using the product 
under normal household conditions." 
ld. A similar standard is set forth in Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1972 (1974); 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 FTC. 398, 463 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973). 
106. Comment, The Substantiation Program: You Can Fool All of the People Some of the Time 
and Some 0/ the People All ofthe Time, But Can You Fool the FTC?, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 429, 455­
56 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. One advertiser claims that the Commission 
staff "seems to believe that all claims should be subject to absolute proof." Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., Remarks in Response to the FTC's Request for Comments About the 
Advertising Substantiation Program 18 (March 11, 1983) (Commission's request 
available in 48 Fed. Reg. 10471) [hereinafter cited as Sears]. The same advertiser also 
has said that the requirement merely means that for every claim there must be merely a 
document in the file. ld. at 16. 
107. 81 F.T.C. 23, 65 (1972). 
108. ld. at 72-73. 
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claim-e.g., personal injury, property damage; (4) the degree 
of reliance by consumers on the claims; (5) the type, and ac­
cessibility, of evidence adequate to form a reasonable basis for 
making the particular claims. 109 
The Commission gave no indication as to how these factors are to 
be evaluated, weighed, and applied in practice.1lO 
In American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, the court approved a very 
complete and exacting cease and desist order for many claims re­
garding superior effectiveness or superior freedom from side effects 
for non- prescription analgesics. I I 1 The order covered both claims 
with an implied assertion of support by scientific evidence and 
claims that the manufacturer had not qualified by stating that there 
was a substantial question regarding the claim. In Bristol-Myers 
Co., 112 the Commission required at least two well- controlled clinical 
studies 1l3 for "establishment" claims that any non- prescription in­
ternal analgesics were superior to other brands in effectiveness or 
freedom from side effects. 1 14 The Commission also prohibited Bris­
tol-Myers from making any representations concerning therapeutic 
performance or freedom from side effects of any non-prescription 
internal analgesic without a "reasonable basis" consisting of "com­
petent and reliable scientific evidence." I I!> In a companion case, the 
Commission required the makers of Bayer aspirin to have two or 
more adequate, well-controlled, clinical investigations to support 
any claim that superior effectiveness had been established, to have a 
"reasonable basis" for other therapeutic performance claims, and to 
have "competent and reliable scientific evidence" for a claim of su­
perior freshness, purity, stability, or speed of disintegration of 
products. 116 
In American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, the Commission dealt with 
the advertising of Anacin. The Commission introduced two doc­
trines regarding the application of the substantiation requirement: 
the establishment claims doctrine and the substantial question doc­
109. /d. at M. 
110. Presumably the Commission recognized the imprecision of the rule it was 
establishing when it recognized that the factors were "overlapping considerations." /d. 
Ill. 695 F.2d 681, 714·15 (3d Cir. 1983). 
112. 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aif'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984). 
113. Well·controlled clinical tests require that the perfonnance of the drug be 
compared with the perfonnance of a "placebo." A statistically significant sampling must 
be used and patients must be randomly selected for either the drug or the placebo. The 
test must be "double blind," that is neither the experimenter nor the subjects must 
know whether the drug or a placebo is being used. [d. at 125-26. 
114. 102 F.T.C. 21, 126 (1983), aif'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984). 
115. /d. at 312. 
116. Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395, 796, aff'd, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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trine. The former was applied where the Commission found an im­
plied or express representation that the manufacturer had scientific 
proof of the claim. For example, the claim that Anacin was superior 
to other analgesics was represented to be scientifically established 
because the advertisement stated that it was "medically proven."1l7 
Where the advertiser made an establishment claim, the Commission 
required the advertiser to have two well-controlled clinical tests sup­
porting the claim. lIB 
With regard to the substantial question doctrine, the Commission 
identified claims for which the advertiser may have had a "reason­
able basis," but for which, absent well-controlled clinical tests, there 
was a "substantial question" about the truth of the claim. The ad­
vertisement was deceptive if the advertiser did not inform consum­
ers of this reason to doubt the advertiser's claim. 
In 1983, four years after deciding American Home Products Corp. v. 
FTC, the Commission decided Bristol-Myers Co., 119 which involved 
the advertising ofBufferin, Excedrin, and Excedrin P.M. and Sterling 
Drug, Inc.,120 which dealt with the advertising of Bayer Aspirin, 
Bayer Children's Aspirin, Cope, Vanquish, and MidoL In each case, 
the Commission found that some claims, such as the claim that the 
product would relieve tension, were deceptive because they were 
made without substantiation by a "reasonable basis."121 Moreover, 
the establishment claims were deceptive because they were made 
without an even higher level of substantiation, that is two well-con­
trolled clinical tests. In some instances, the representation of scien­
tific establishment was express, such as "scientific tests show that in 
the first critical moments Bufferin delivers twice as much pain re­
liever as simple aspirin."122 The Commission pointed out that it 
was irrelevant that none of the advertisements actually used the 
word "established."123 In some instances, the representation of sci­
entific establishment was implied, such as the use of a graphic dis­
play of Excedrin's chemical formula. 124 The Commission discarded 
the substantial question doctrine, reasoning that it resulted in a re­
117. 695 F.2d 681, 690 (3d Cir. 1982) (amended 1983). 
118. !d. 
ll9. 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984). 
120. 102 F.T.C. 395, aff'd, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984). 
121. 102 F.T.C. 21, 375, aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984). 
122. Id. at 92-93. 
123. Id. at 372. Other examples of establishment language are "It has been clinically 
observed that ... ," "medical evidence," and claims that ingredients are "medically 
endorsed." !d. at 21. 
124. The Commission held that the use of the words "medically endorsed" and the 
formula image imbued the ads with an aura of scientific support. [d. at 271. 
Nevertheless, the Commission found that the use of glass models of people with 
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quirement that the standards the Commission applied to establish­
ment claims would apply to all claims.125 In other words, the 
Commission feared that the substantial question doctrine blurred 
the distinction between establishment claims and non-establishment 
claims. 126 
However, after handing down' the Bristol-Myers Co. and Sterling 
Drug, Inc. decisions, the Commission adopted a new policy state­
ment with regard to the advertising substantiation program.127 
That policy statement provides that advertisers will be expected to 
have whatever level of support they expressly or impliedly state they 
have for a particular claim. 128 .When it is not clear what level of sup­
port consumers expect an advertiser to possess, the Commission 
will determine the amount of substantiation to require by consider­
ing "the consequences of a false claim, the benefits of a truthful 
claim, the cost of developing substantiation for the claim, and the 
amount of substantiation experts m the field believe IS 
reasonable."129 
The most re~ent of the analgesic advertising substantiation cases 
is Thompson Medical CO.,130 which involved Aspercreme, a topical 
cream rub marketed as a remedy for relief from arthritis pain. In 
Thompson, the substantiation doctrine was applied, according to the 
Commission, in conformance with the Commission's new guide­
lines. First, the Commission dealt with a number of claims that were 
alleged to be deceptive. For example, the advertiser claimed that 
Bufferin and aspirin tablets crumbling in the stomachs and reforming in their heads did 
indicate that Bufferin's superior speed had been scientifically established. 
125. /d. at 307. 
126. The Commission believed that if it was considered a violation to fail to disclose a 
lack of substantiation, then that was identical to requiring the substantiation. 
127. SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19. At the outset the Commission stated 
that advertisers must have substantiation for objective product claims. Id. at 2. Because 
the Commission outlines a reasonable basis standard (divorced from consumer 
expectations) later in the statement, it is not clear what relationship this introductory 
paragraph has to the rest of the statement. It may be that the Commission was limiting 
the entire substantiation requirement to "objective" claims, although that term is not 
defined. However, it may have the unfortunate effect of removing the substantiation 
requirement from claims regarding consumer satisfaction that may be equally significant 
to consumers. 
128. The Commission gave as examples of express claims of substantiation language 
such as "tests prove," "doctors recommend," and "studies show." Of course, it is not 
dear what kind of substantiation is expressly claimed by such vague language as "tests 
show." 
129. SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 5. Chairman Miller labeled the 
consequences to consumers of false claims and the benefits of true claims as the most 
important. Miller, supra note 55, at 3. 
130. 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984). 
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Aspercreme contains aspirin and is more effective than orally in­
gested aspirin. 
The Commission now considers a claim deceptive only if the peti­
tioner proves that the claim is "likely to mislead."I3I In Thompson, 
the Commission held that there are two ways to prove "likely to mis­
lead." One is to prove that the claim is not true and the other is to 
prove that the claim is an objective product claim, made without a 
reasonable basis. Thus, the Commission also considered the 
"claim" that the advertiser had a particular level of substantiation 
for the product as one of the allegedly deceptive claims. The Com­
mission appeared to consider the advertising substantiation doc­
trine as an aspect of its adjudication of allegations of deceptive 
claims. If the Commission was finding that all objective claims are 
likely to mislead if not substantiated, then the Commission was ap­
plying the "substantial question" doctrine, which it rejected in Bris­
tol-J.\1yers Co. 132 
The Commission also considered separately allegations that 
Thompson did not have a reasonable basis for claims that Asper­
creme is an effective drug for the relief of arthritic pain. To deter­
mine the level of substantiation to require where the advertiser has 
made no claim of substantiation, the Commission held that it would 
examine the same factors outlined in the policy statement. 133 After 
examining the six factors, the Commission decided that two well­
controlled clinical tests were required. The Commission also held 
that claims could be made if approved by the FDA, although the 
claims were based on less than two well-controlled clinical tests. I34 
While it appears that the Commission has been shifting its stan­
dards and rationales, it also appears that in advertising claims for 
over-the-counter analgesics, two well-controlled clinical tests are re­
quired for most product claims. Unfortunately, the cases give little 
guidance concerning the amount of substantiation required for ad­
vertising of other products. 
B. Standards Based on "Purposes of" Requirement 
1. Deceptive' Behavior 
Questions about the amount of substantiation to require are an­
swered by maintaining a focus on the two purposes of the advertis­
131. [d, 
132. See supra notes 119, 121-26 and accompanying text. 
133. Thompson Medical Co., 104 FTC. 648, 788 (1984). 
134. The Commission refused to adopt the traditional approach of characterizing 
some claims as "establishment claims." Rather, it chose to deal with those types of 
claims under its discussion of deception. 
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ing substantiation program suggested above, i.e., proscription of 
both deceptive' and deceptiveP conduct. When viewing the program 
as aimed at deceptive' behavior, the true concern of the consumer is 
not whether the claim of substantiation (express or implied) is true, 
but whether the claim regarding the effectiveness of the product is 
true. 
Given this goal of the substantiation requirement, identifying de­
ceptive statements is important. It is necessary to have a test for 
deception to establish a test for advertising substantiation. Unfortu­
nately, the Commission has been no clearer in defining deception 
than it has been in defining reasonable basis. Therefore, it is neces­
sary to propose a standard for labeling deception. 
a. Difining Deception 
Although the deceptive advertising mission of the Commission is 
an extension of the common law actions of fraud and deceit, Con­
gress intended the term "deceptive" to proscribe more conduct 
than is included in traditional fraud or deceit actions. 135 Neverthe­
135. See supra note 11. The following is the generally accepted definition of the tort of 
deceit: 
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, 
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain 
from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit 
for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the 
misrepresentation. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, at § 525. 
With regard to the knowledge of the speaker, the tort of deceit presumably requires 
that the misrepresentation be intentional. That requirement has been relaxed in a vari­
ety of ways which place greater risks on the seller. The RESTATEMENT now contains the 
following: 
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker 
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be, 
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representa­
tion that he states or implies, or 
(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that 
he states or implies. 
[d. at § 526 (Conditions Under Which Misrepresentation is Fraudulent Scienter). See, 
e.g., Pumphey v. Quillen, 102 Ohio App. 173, 141 N.E.2d 675 (1955), aff'd, 165 Ohio St. 
343, 135 N.E.2d 328 (1956). 
Subsections 526 (b) and (c) reduce the difficulty ofpraving scienter. They also intro­
duce a note of negligence into the scienter requirement. Although negligent misrepre­
sentation technically is not covered by deceit, the making of a statement without a basis 
for it can be seen as a negligent act. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 107, at 711-12 
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, at § 528 
("A representation that is believed to state the truth but which because of negligent 
expression states what is false is a negligent but not a fraudulent misrepresentation.") 
There appears to be an intentional misstatement, i.e., the misstatement of assurance in 
the main statement. Because few buyers will act on a statement made equivocally, a 
court likely would find any statement as one with an implied statement of confidence. 
30 CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 55 
less, the essential policy underlying actions in deceit and actions 
against deceptive practices is the same: sellers should not be able to 
induce consumers to purchase goods or services by making untrue 
statements. This is a goal which goes to the heart of our economic 
system, a goal that presupposes that the "market" will allocate the 
production and distribution of goods and services. 136 The success 
of such a system depends on the presence of accurate 
information. 137 
Therefore, some policy distinction must be made to determine when RESTATEMENT 
§ 528 applies. 
Moreover, courts have also found statements made with reckless disregard of the truth 
as fraudulent. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Howle, 56 A.2d 709 (D.C. 1948) (actual knowledge 
of untruthfulness of representations unnecessary); james & Gray, 111isrepresentation-Part 
I, 37 MD. L. REV. 286, 298 (1977); Note, Deceit and Negligent Misrepresentation in Maryland, 
35 MD. L. REV. 650 (1976). This can be interpreted as the application of a presumption 
arising from the court's disbelief that the defendant really did not know that a statement 
was false. "When one asserts a fact as of his own knowledge, or so positively as to imply 
that he has knowledge, when he knows that he has not sufficient information to justify it, 
he may be found to have the intent to deceive." Pumphrey v. Quillen, 102 Ohio App. 
173, 181, 141 N.E.2d 675,681 (1955) aff'd, 165 Ohio St. 343,135 N.E.2d 328 (1956). 
See Note, supra at 654. In other words, once it is demonstrated that a defendant should 
have known that the statement was false, a defendant would have to prove that he actu­
ally did not know it was false. Presumably, in such situations, a court would likely find 
the defendant liable. 
With some unevenness, courts have also adopted theories of negligent and innocent 
misrepresentation. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 107, at 711-12 (4th ed. 
1971); Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COL. L. REV. 679, 688-92 (1973); 
Note, supra, at 654; see also Restatement, supra note 38, at § 552, § 552C. An innocent 
misrepresentation might apply only where the seller is in a much better position than the 
buyer to know that the statement was false. In some cases, relaxed scienter require­
ments are based on the nature of the injuries suffered. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 
38, at § 402B (strict liability for harm caused to consumer purchase of goods). The law 
of express warranty is also a law of innocent misrepresentation or strict liability. V.C.C. 
§ 2-313 (1978). Vnder the VCC an express warranty must be part of the basis of the 
bargain and many of the limitations of contract warranty law apply. See, e.g., V.C.C. § 2­
313; 2-318 (1978). 
136. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J. 
L. & ECON. 403, 492 (1981); Jordan & Rubin, supra note 64, at 532; Developments in the 
Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1026 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 
Develvpments]. Chairman Miller stated, "Advertising simply cannot fulfill its potential in 
our market system if consumers cannot rely on the truthfulness of the messages 
disseminated to them. The role for the government is to engender such trust by making 
sure it is warranted." Remarks of james C. Miller III, Chairman, Federal Trade 
Commission, Before American Advertising Federation 1,4 Gune 4, 1984); Remarks of 
James C. Miller III, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Before the San Francisco 
Advertising Club 6 (September 30, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Miller]. To the extent 
that advertising causes consumers to purchase products they would not otherwise 
purchase there is a misallocation of resources. Society would be better able to satisfy the 
wants and needs of people who had accurate information. 
137. Accurate information is one of the assumptions made in models of the free 
market. 
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There are two significant distinctions between actions in deceit 
and actions against deceptive practices. The first distinction is that 
deceit is concerned with a particular transaction and deception is 
concerned with conduct involving many transactions. Secondly, un­
like deceit, deception can involve conduct in which no one yet has 
been harmed. I38 Therefore, in a deception action it is not possible 
to inquire into what the seller said and intended and what the buyer 
actually heard, thought, and wanted. 139 In a deceit action, the ques­
tion of whether the seller's statement is true or false presents no 
analytical difficulty. To determine whether the consumer's reliance 
was reasonable in a deceit action, courts may be able to apply, even 
if intuitively, a rational standard, such as determining which party 
was better able to avoid the risk. Common law deceit jurisprudence 
is not easily transferrable to deception. For example, inquiry into 
the meaning of an advertisement is complicated because a single ad­
vertising statement can be interpreted in different ways by many in­
dividual consumers. There is no dispute as to the representation 
made by those statements expressly contained in an advertisement, 
but the Commission claims that many representations are implied in 
an advertisement. 14o It is one thing to say that implied statements 
may be actionable and another to determine what statements are 
implied in an advertisement. 
The Commission relies upon a variety of techniques to establish 
the meaning of an advertisement. Often the Commission makes its 
138. As a civil law action, one of the elements of deceit is damage. See supra note 145. 
The same is true of negligent and innocent misrepresentation and warranty actions. 
139. The seller's intent as well as the buyer's reliance on the seller's words are 
relevant in deceit. See supra note 135. 
140. As in the law of deceit, a seller can be responsible for the variety of meanings 
which an advertisement may convey. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 135, at § 527. See, 
e.g., Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 
(1980) (presentation of testimonials implies that typical users have same experience); 
Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962) (reference in shoe 
circular to physical ailments could be taken by reader to be unqualified assertions of 
therapeutic worth); FTC v. Morrissey, 47 F.2d 101, 103 (7th Cir. 1931) (use of name of 
fruit on label might imply that it is ingredient if clear indication of actual ingredients is 
not provided). Even trade names themselves can be misleading. See, e.g., Carter Prod., 
Inc. v. FTC 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959) (ordering word 
"liver" deleted from name "Carter's Little Liver Pills"); Elliot Knitware v. FTC, 266 
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959); ("Cashmora" labelling on sweaters that contained no cashmere 
was not deemed deceptive per se); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 
676 (2d Cir. 1944) (labeling skin cream "Rejuvenescence" implies it will rejuvenate the 
skin ... or restore youth ...). The implied meanings often are referred to as deceptive 
omissions. See, e.g., American Motors Corp., 100 F.T.C. 229 (1982) (deceptive omission 
of information regarding Jeep's handling and maneuverability). This approach is often 
expressly stated in many state deceptive practices acts. See, e.g., Md. Commercial Law 
§ 13-301(3) (1983) (Supp. 1983) (must state material fact iffailure to do so is deceptive). 
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own independent judgment of the meaning of an advertisement. 141 
The Commission relies upon the "general impression" of an adver­
tisement, rather than the literal meaning of each individual assertion 
in an advertisement. 142 Sometimes dictionary definitions are 
cited. 143 In other cases, the testimony of experts or consumer wit­
nesses are used. 144 Increasingly, "scientific" surveys are used. 145 
All of these methods demonstrate the ways in which some people 
might interpret an advertisement. They are not accompanied, how­
ever, by a standard for determining which interpretations are 
"meanings" against which the Commission should protect. Espe­
cially because advertisements are viewed independently of any anal­
ysis of the intent of the advertiser,146 the issue is not what the 
sender of the message was trying to say, but what the recipient un­
derstood the seller to say. The "meaning" of an advertisement is, 
141. See, e.g.,]. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884,886 (6th Cir. 1967). Gellhorn 
refers to this as the "intuitive" or "hunch'" approach. Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer 
Deception Bifore the Federal Trade Commissilfn, 17 KAN. L. REV. 559, 565 (1969). See also, 
Brandt & Preston, The FTC's Use of Evidence to Determine Deception, 41]. MKTG. 54 (1971) 
(although 95% of Commission's decisions are based on Commission's impression of 
sales representations, Commission increasingly looks to "external" sources). 
142. See, e.g., American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1983). 
143. See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944). 
144. One often-cited and particularly imaginative use of consumer testimony involved 
an advertisement which stated that a hair coloring would be "permanent." A consumer 
witness acknowledged that some might take the word to mean that new hair would grow 
in with the artificial color after treatment but that she knew better. Gelb v. FTC, 144 
F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1944). Sometimes consumer testimony is rejected. Leonard F. 
Porter, Inc. 88 F.T.C. 546, 596 (1976) (a particular consumer's testimony is "not a 
reliable guide to typical consumer assumptions"); Gimbel Bros., 61 F.T.C. 11051 
(1962). 
145. In the past, the Commission has expressed a reluctance to examine survey 
results. See, e.g.,]. B. Williams Co., 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1964); Ford Motor Co., 87 
F.T.C. 756, 794 (1976). But more recently the Commission has stated that where 
consumer survey data is available it is "incumbent upon us ... to consider it." Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 454 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.) , ccrt. denied, 
414 U.S. 1112 (1973). See also Bristol-Myers Co., 85 F.T.C. 688 (1975); ITr Continental 
Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, modified, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), aff'd, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 
1976). The Commission has recently relied upon consumer survey results in granting 
requests to modify orders. See, e.g., Encydopedia Britannica, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 500 
(1982); Reader's Digest Assoc., Inc., No. C-2075 (IFTC Sept. 30, 1983). 
146. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967); 
D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679,682 (7th Cir. 1942); Pep Boys v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 
161 (3d Cir. 1941); Gimbel Bros. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578,579 (2d Cir. 1941). Similarly, in 
state consumer protection proceedings, plaintiffs are not required to prove intent to 
deceive or knowledge of the deception on the part of the business. See, e.g., Bell v. Kent­
Brown Chevrolet Co., 1 Kan. App. 131,561 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. Kan. 1977); Testo v. 
Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (Ct. App. Wash. 
1976); Slaney v. Westwood Ave., Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768 (1975). 
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therefore, created by the reader. 147 Dictionaries provide only a pre­
ferred meaning for words. Surveys suggest only the number of peo­
ple who attach a particular meaning to a particular statement. 
Because any statement can be interpreted to have more than one 
meaning, when the Commission establishes the meaning of an ad­
vertisement, it actually is determining which of the many interpreta­
tions of a message are "reasonable." A challenge of the 
Commission's proposed meaning of an advertisement is in reality a 
challenge of the desirability of protecting those people who derive 
that meaning from the ad. 
Another issue in Commission litigation is often articulated as the 
level of consumer intelligence that is relevant in analyzing an adver­
tisement. A number of phrases have been used to indicate that ad­
vertisements must be judged by the standard of their ability to 
deceive not just intelligent consumers, but also the less acute. A 
sampling of the phrases used includes the expressions of intent to 
protect "the trusting as well as the suspicious," 148 "the average indi­
vidual,"149 the "buying public,"150 and the "ignorant, the unthink­
ing, and the credulous."151 Nevertheless, the Commission rec­
ognizes that there must be some lower limits on the consumer "in­
telligence" to be protected. In one case, the Commission stated 
that, "An advertiser cannot be charged with liability in respect of 
every conceivable misconception, however outlandish, to which his 
representations might be subjected among the foolish or feeble­
147. "[E]ven the literal meaning of a sentence is at bottom a matter of semantic 
convention, and it could certainly be argued that the meaning of a sentence (and of its 
surrounding context) can be defined only by reference to what its audience takes it to 
mean." Beales, supra note 136, at 497. 
148. See, e.g., Gelb v. JTTC, 144 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1944); Giant Food, Inc., 61 
F.T.C. 326, 346 (1962). 
149. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941); American Horne 
Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 689 (3d Cir. 1983) (It is not necessary to read 
advertisements in such a way to "preclude the Commission from taking action against 
advertisements that, when read with scrupulous care by vigilant and literal minded 
consumers, could be seen to be making true claims."). 
150. See, e.g., Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956). 
151. See, e.g., Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2rl 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961) ("The 
Commission should look not to the most sophisticated reader, but rather to the least."); 
Aronberg v. l'TC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1943); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 
U.S. 112, 116 (1937); see also Parker Pen Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1946) 
("Commission's duty is to protect the casual, one might say the negligent, reader, as 
well as the vigilant and more intelligent discerning public"); General Motors Corp. v. 
FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940) ("It may be that there was no intention to mislead 
and that only the careless or the incompetent could be misled. But if the Commission, 
having discretion to deal with these matters, thinks it best to insist upon a form of 
advertising clear enough so that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah, 'wayfaring men, 
though fools, shall not err herein,' it is not for the courts to revise their judgment."). 
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minded."152 There are a number of other ways of articulating the 
standard. For example, the Commission has held that many claims 
are puffing. I53 
Despite attempts to indicate that there is some lower limit to 
Commission protection, the Commission has protected particularly 
vulnerable groups. 154 Unfortunately, neither the general statements 
with regard to consumer intelligence, nor the vulnerable group pol­
icy, suggest a clear standard for determining whether an advertise­
ment is deceptive. The general statements do not contain any clue 
as to the policy considerations that would guide such a determina­
tion. Stating the policy in terms of attacking advertisements which 
deceive "vulnerable" groups does not provide a solution to the 
problem of identifying those situations where Commission interven­
tion is appropriate, because a single person deceived by a particular 
advertisement would be a vulnerable group of one. Moreover, the 
Commission would still have to determine how many members of an 
identified vulnerable group must be deceived to warrant a conclu­
sion that an advertisement is deceptive. 
The problem is that some people probably interpret an advertise­
ment to make a representation about a product and this representa­
tion is not true. Some people are fooled by the advertisement and 
some of them buy the product. The issue is how to determine 
whether that some deserve government intervention. Is5 
152. See, e.g., FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 676 (2d cir. 1963) (no violation 
if ordinary reader, to be misled, must have "not only a careless and imperceptive mind 
but also a propensity for unbounded flights of fancy"). 
153. See, e.g., Kidder Oil Co. v. FTC, 117 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1941) (claims that product 
is "perfect" and enables car to go an "amazing distance" are puffing); Liggett & Myers 
Tobacco Co., 55 F.T.C. 354, 368 (1958) (statements that cigarette was "milder" and 
"soothing" were not puffing; Commission did not indicate whether pun was intended). 
The Commission also must demonstrate the materiality of the statement. This 
materiality usually can be an aspect of the requirement for causation. The United States 
Supreme Court has defined deception as the "misrepresentation of any fact so long as it 
materially induces a purchaser'S decision to buy." FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 
U.S. 374, 387 (1965) (emphasis added). In FTCA cases as in tort, materiality more often 
is considered as an element of the reasonableness of the reliance. See, e.g., James & 
Gray, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 MD. L. REV. 488, 493 (1978). 
154. See, e.g., Hudson Pharmaceutical Corp., 89 F.T.C. 82, 86 (1977) (using 
Spiderman to advertise vitamins); Tri-State Driver Training, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 417 (1976) 
(deceiving unemployed by promising jobs). 
155. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 136, at 495-96 ("[T]he legal definition of 
deception does not require any such stopping place, nor does it offer any principles to 
suggest where a good stopping place would be.") The authors point out that under 
existing definitions of deception "every advertisement in the country [is] potentially 
deceptive." /d. at 495. 
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A number of proposals have been made to use empirical research 
to make these judgments. 156 Ernest Gellhorn has proposed that 
whenever there is a dispute regarding the interpretation of an ad­
vertisement the Commission should request that independent 
surveys resolve the issue.157 The surveys should indicate not only 
the number of people deceived, but also the significance of the de­
ception. 158 Gellhorn recognizes problems with deciding what to do 
with the statistics once they are gathered. He rejects establishing per 
se rules, such as that an advertisement is actionable if more than 
14% of the people are deceived, because, "The scope and signifi­
cance of the hann should affect the level at which the threshold of 
prohibited deception is established."159 He suggests that when 
there is possible health or safety harm, an advertisement is actiona­
ble if 1 % or 2% (not more than 5%) of the people are deceived; 
when there is only economic harm, 10% or 15% deception is tolera­
ble. 160 Unfortunately, he does not reveal how he arrived at those 
particular figures. 161 
The failure to recognize the need for a workable standard by 
which to evaluate empirical research appears in other similar pro­
posals as well. 162 When reaching the question of how to evaluate 
156. Chairman Miller was anxious to see empirical research used in Commission 
decision making. See Miller, supra note 136. The Commission, beginning with the 
studies to determine the residual effects of Listerine advertising, showed an interest in 
belief-based measures to judge the level of deception. Armstrong, Gurol & Russ, 
Defining and Measuring Deception, in ADVERTISING: A REVIEW AND EVALUATION IN CURRENT 
ISSUES AND RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING: 198028 (J. Leigh & R. Martin eds. 1980). The 
Commission recently used survey evidence presented by the Reader's Digest to modify 
its order prohibiting the publisher from including in sweepstake's promotions 
"simulated checks, currency ... [or] any confusingly simulated item of value. Reader's 
Digest Assoc., 102 F.T.C. 1268 (1983). The Digest presented the results of an elaborate 
survey in which interviewers traveled door to door to observe recipients impressions to 
the advertising pieces. Request to Reopen and Modify Consent Order, Reader's Digest 
Assoc., 102 F.T.C. 1268 (1983). 
157. Gellhom, supra note 141, at 567-72. 
158. Id. at 571. 
159. [d. 
160. [d. at 572. 
161. To be fair, it must be conceded that he uses the figures only as examples. But he 
fails to provide the standard by which real figures should be derived. 
In one case where there were surveys indicating that at least 15.3% of the "tire 
purchasers" were deceived by an advertisement which involved "safety" claims, the 
Commission indicated that the deception was not actionable. Firestone Tire and 
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398,453-55 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), art. denied, 414 
U.S. 1112 (1973). Rather than accept the survey findings the Commission went to great 
length to discredit them, thus indicating that the scope of deception demonstrated by 
the survey did not seem impressive. 
162. Commissioners often have advocated the use of advertising copy tests without 
explaining what standards would be used to evaluate the results of such tests. See, e.g., 
the testimony of Commissioner Clanton. Hearings, supra note 94, at 84. For example, 
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the research, writers suggest that the Commission must determine 
the appropriate consumer intelligence level. 163 The difficulty with 
that approach is that the use of behavior research is advocated be­
cause such standards as "intelligence level" provide little guidance. 
There is no basis on which to arbitrarily select a percentage for mis­
leadingness. Although the Commission has used survey research 
data,164 it has never articulated a reason for finding that where a 
particular percentage of consumers interpret an advertisement in a 
particular way, the advertisement is or is not deceptive. 165 
The Commission has attempted to promulgate a more workable 
definition of deception. In 1982, Commission Chairman Miller pro­
posed to Congress that Section 5 be amended to include the 
following: 
A deceptive act or practice is a material representation that: 
(a) Is likely to mislead consumers, acting reasonably in 
the circumstances, to their detriment; or 
Comment, supra note 106, suggests use of behavioral research to evaluate advertising. 
But the writer never explains how the behavioral research is to be used. Another writer 
suggests that the Commission not be concerned with how consumers might interpret an 
advertisement, but how they do interpret it. Pollay, Deceptive Advertising and Consumer 
Behavior: A Case/or Legislative and Judicial Reform, 17 KANS. L. REV. 625 (1969). Pollay 
suggests the use of rigorous research methodologies, but he recognizes that a judgment 
must be made in evaluating the research. Id. at 637. See Armstrong, supra note 156, at 
33 (there is no simple answer to question of how much deception we will tolerate). One 
FTC Commissioner expressed the view that the appropriate standard was that the 
amount of harm would be greater than the cost of Commission enforcement. 
Thompson, Memorandum to the Federal Trade Commission, (available in 7 ANTITRUST L. & 
ECON. REV. 27 (1974-75». 
In modifYing the Reader's Digest Order, (see supra note 156) the Commission not only 
did not question the validity of using door to door interviews to determine consumer 
reaction to a mailing piece but also did not attempt to translate the Digest's statistics 
into a quantity of harm resulting from deception. 
163. See, e.g., Mann & Gurol, An Objective Approach to Detecting and Correcting Deceptive 
Advertising, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 73 (1978). Mann & Gurol conducted a survey to 
establish the ability to determine deception, but could say only that the deception score 
should be measured for the "relevant group," meaning the proper "intelligence level," 
and that the Commission must establish a threshold score for various products and 
categories, beyond which an advertisement is considered deceptive. The writers suggest 
that the threshold score should be based on the scope and significance of the possible 
harm. !d. at 100 & n.160. 
164. See, e.g., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 500 (1982) (consent order 
which appears to tolerate deception at level of 25%); Bristol-Myers Co., 85 F.T.C. 688, 
745 (1975) (2-4% held to be "patently insubstantial"); I.T.T. Continental Banking Co., 
83 F.T.C. 865 (1973) (10-14% is deceptive); In re RJR Foods, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 7 (1973) 
(consent order which appears to tolerate deception at level of 5%); Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 461-62 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.) , cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1112 (1973) (1.4% not deceptive, 14% is deceptive); Benrus Watch Co., 64 F.T.C. 
1018, 1032 (1964) (14% is deceptive); Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 49 F.T.C. 263 (1952) 
(9% is deceptive). 
165. See supra note 162. 
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(b) the representor knew or should have known would be 
misleading. 166 
Congress refused to adopt that change. On October 14, 1983, the 
Commission announced a very similar enforcement policy statement 
with regard to deceptive acts or practices. I67 It stated that, "the 
FTC will find deception if there is a representation, omission or 
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in 
the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment."168 The statement 
is defended by the majority of the Commission as nothing more 
than a restatement and synthesis of prior law. I69 Two members of 
the Commission view it as an attempt to limit the Commission's abil­
ity to protect consumers.I70 
There are two aspects of the statement which appear to be signifi­
canLI7I The first is the requirement that only consumers acting rea­
166. See Letter from James C. Miller III to the Honorable Robert Packwood (October 
14, 1983) (Attached dissenting statement of Commissioner M. Pertschuk at 4) 
[hereinafter cited as Miller Letter]. The Chairman revived the proposal in 1983. 
Hearings, supra note 94, at 6. 
167. Miller Letter, supra note 166. 
168. !d. at 4. 
169. !d. at 2; Federal Trade Commission Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Transportation, and Tourism ofthe House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1984) (Prepared Statement of James C. Miller III, Chairman FTC at 9) [hereinafter 
cited as Miller Statement]. 
170. Letter from P. Bailey & M. Pertschuk to the Hon.John D. Dingell (Feb. 28, 1984) 
(attached analysis of deception) [hereinafter cited as Bailey]. Their objections were 
included later in a law review article. The National Association of Attorneys General 
opposed the Commission's proposed amendment of § 5 because many state statutes 
require following Commission interpretations of the FTCA when interpreting state 
consumer protection acts. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, RESOLUTIONS AT 
ANNUAL MEETING, MACKINAC ISLAND, MICHIGAN II (July 15-18, 1982). Many state 
consumer protection statutes include provisions stating that the legislature intended 
that in construing the act the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the 
Commission and the Federal Courts to Section 5(a)(J) of the FTCA. See Federal Trade 
Commission Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of 
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Prepared statement 
ofJohn T. Montgomery, Chief of Mass. Consumer Protection at 6) [hereinafter cited as 
Montgomery]. The chairman of the House Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Transportation, and Tourism also strongly opposed the statement. Florio Assails New 
F T.G. Policy on Ads, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, at 29, col. 1. 
171. Actually the statement is divided into three parts: 

L There must be a representation, omission, or practice, that is likely to 

mislead the consumer. Miller Letter, supra note 166, at 4. 

II. The Act or Practice Must Be Considered From the Perspective of the 
Reasonable Consumer. [d. at 7. 
III. The Representation, Omission or Practice must be Material. [d. at 
15 (Note that the above have been renumbered for purposes of this 
discussion. In the original statement, roman numeral I is introductory.) 
The conclusion that the words "likely to mislead" refer to materiality is based on the 
fact that in the section dealing with Part I, the Commission only outlines the kinds of 
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sonably be protected. The Commission thinks that this formulation 
of words more clearly sets the standard for the types of misrepre­
sentations that are actionable, while the minority thinks that phrases 
such as protecting the "trusting as well as the suspicious" are 
clearer statements of what is actionable. 172 The Commission con­
siders a "reasonable" interpretation of an advertisement to be one 
shared by a "significant and representative segment of the popula­
tion exposed to the claim." 173 According to the Chairman, the rea­
sonable consumer standard "simply requires that we interpret ads 
as ordinary consumers dO."174 He states that the Commission con­
sciously rejected a standard based on a "substantial number" of 
consumers being misled, because it is not clear how many consum­
practices which may be actionable (e.g., affirmative misrepresentations, omissions, bait 
and switch) and does not deal with the meaning of the word "likely" or how we would 
determine likeliness. !d. at 4-7. However, in Part III, the Commission states that "A 
material misrepresentation or practice is one which is likely to affect a consumer's choice 
of ... a product." !d. at 15-16 (emphasis added). See alsQ id. at attached concurring 
statement of Commissioner George W. Douglas. In his prepared remarks before the 
House Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism. Chairman Miller re­
fers to "likely" as a substitute for "tendency or'capacity." He sees both as differing from 
a requirement of finding "actual deception to conclude that a violation of section 5 has 
occurred." Miller Statement, supra note 169, at 9. Further, the Commission equates 
materiality with damages: "[J]njury and materiality are different names for the same con­
cept." Miller Letter, supra note 166, at 19. This is somewhat ofa deviation from tradi­
tional tort analysis in which materiality is an aspect of causation and could exist without 
actual injury. The Commission's analysis would be satisfactory if the Commission would 
accept that whenever consumers buy a product based on inaccurate information (and 
that inaccurate information was material to their decision), the Commission would con­
sider the misstatement actionable. In fact, the Commission would require some showing 
ofa significant public harm (e.g., a substantial number of people buying a product worth 
$1.00 for $2.00) and would not act where there was no such harm (e.g., even if a sub­
stantial number of people bought a product because it believed that a celebrity endorser 
used the product where the product was in fact worth the price and did what it claimed 
to do). Moreover, deception requires harm sufficient to warrant public intervention. All 
three concepts (the reasonableness of the consumer, the materiality of the claim, and the 
amount of damage) are ways of approaching the same question: how much consumer 
purchasing under a misapprehension is tolerable before the claim is actionable (or when 
are we going to assign the risk of consumer purchases under a misapprehension to the 
seller and when to the buyer)? 
172. See, e.g., Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1944). 
173. See Miller Statement, supra note 169, at 9, 10. The use of the word 
"representative" is puzzling. In Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 
751 (2d CiL 1963), the Commission said that "A representation does not become 'false 
and deceptive' merely because it will be unreasonably understood by an insigificant and 
unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is 
addressed." Presumably this means that if a sample of the population is chosen the 
sample should be representative of the total population. 
174. Miller Statement, supra note 169, at 10. He rejects the idea that using a 
"reasonableness" standard denies protection to unsophisiticated or gullible consumers 
by repeating that "it simply requires that the Commission interpret claims as people 
ordinarily do." Id. 
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ers constitute a substantial number and because such a standard 
would prevent protection of even a few people misled by "the most 
blatant fraud." 
However, "substantial" is no more indeterminate than "reason­
able." Like the concept of "substantial number,"175 the term "rea­
sonable" is indeterminate and can be given meaning only in 
application. 176 
The second significant aspect of the statement involves the need 
for a finding of materiality. The words "likely to mislead" and "to 
the consumer's detriment" are intended to convey some rigor in 
connecting the "misstatement" with some harm. The Commission 
believes that the word "likely" is a replacement for language to the 
effect that a finding of only a "tendency to mislead" is sufficient. 
The Commission thinks that the words "tendency to deceive" or 
"capacity to deceive" are "incantations" and tautological, while 
"likely to mislead" is more informative. Whether the Commission 
believes that the use of this language would have led to a different 
result in past cases is not clear. In other words, the Commission has 
175. The tenn substantial at least has the advantage of coming closer to expressing a 
policy of governmental interference where the benefits of such interference (the amount 
of harm prevented) exceed the cost. Therefore, use of the word "substantial" would be 
more consistent with the commission majority's expressed goal. 
176. Mark Silbergeld, director of the Consumers' Union Washington office, stated 
that: 
To say that the Commission must make a detennination on what a 
reasonable consumer in the circumstances would do leaves the person 
who is looking for guidance as to whether a particular ad is deceptive ... 
just as unclear as he or she may be under the body of existing case law. 
Hearings, supra note 94, at 198. 
Although the common law speaks in tenns of "reasonableness" of reliance, that word 
is used as an indication that the trier of fact (traditionally the jury) should determine 
whether the statement is actionable. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. PROS­
SER, supra note 135, at § 37. The Commission Consumer Protection Division speaks of 
"reasonableness" as "an ancient and honorable legal doctrine . ..." MEMORANDUM, supra 
note 61, at 11 (emphasis added). In fact, both the Commission and the dissenters articu­
late goals which lead to some sort of economic cost benefit analysis. 
This writer believes that the debate is political, not leg-al. The Commission has made 
a priori judgments regarding costs and benefits of particular rules without testing them. 
It then has decided that past advertising regulation is inefficient. The Commission also 
has made the kinds of value judgments discussed earlier and has decided that particular 
groups no longer warrant protection. It may be that the Commission's use of the word 
"reasonable" as a label for the results it reaches in deception cases is a political device to 
defend a change in the Commission's direction while placing opponents in the unenvi­
able position of claiming to favor an "unreasonable." 
The majority may fear that the word "reasonable" will imply that the Commission will 
proceed only where a successful tort action could be supported. Where there are very 
subtle implied claims or where the individual loss is quite small, a tort action would have 
been unlikely. 
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not demonstrated how it would apply the word "likely" to specific 
cases which were disposed of under the "tendency" standard. 
The use of the words "likely" and "reasonable" may in fact have 
connotations which result in a higher standard.177 The troublesome 
aspect of the Commission's statement and the minority's objection 
is not the use of the word "reasonable,"178 it is that both avoid a 
more rational approach to deceptive advertising cases. Despite the 
progress that has been made in the social sciences in understanding 
advertising, and despite the Chairman's own stated preference for 
the use of empirical research in deception cases,179 the Commission 
appears to be merely substituting one indeterminate word for an­
other, rather than attempting to establish the levels of certainty re­
quired and the procedure for revealing and weighing the value 
choices necessary to label conduct deceptive. I80 
However, Commission findings of deception appropriately may 
be tied to a cost benefit analysis. Such an analysis promotes the goal 
of economic efficiency in the regulation of advertising. In fact, it 
appears that both the Commission majority and its dissenters are 
supportive of this goal.1 81 Economic-analysis suggests that govern­
177. Although the Commission now says that the policy statement is just a 
restatement of prior law, the policy statement is based on a Bureau of Consumer 
Protection memorandum in which it is indicated that this is a new standard which would 
lead to a different result in a significant number of cases. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION, MEMORANDUM DEFINING DECEPTION 3-6, 27-29 (undated). 
The Commission minority oqjected to the use of the "likely" to mislead language 
because it "may hamstring the Commission in preventing injury that had not yet 
occurred" and introduce complex evidentiary problems in stopping even clearly 
misleading advertisements. 
Apparently the use of "likely" is a change from a planned requirement for "actual" 
injury, but Commissioner Pertshchuk believes it will lead to the same result. See Miller 
Hearings, supra note 94, attached dissenting statement of Commissioner M. Pertschuk, 
at 7. The chief of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Division believes that the 
Commission's language serves to alter the burden of proof on the issue of materiality. 
Montgomery, supra note 170, at 15. 
Miller Hearings, sujrra note 94, attached dissenting statement of Commissioner M. 
Pertschuk, at 6. 
178. In fact, in outlining the unfairness standard, the Commissioner under Pertschuk 
chairmanship used the word "reasonable." Letter of the FTC to Senators Wendell Ford 
and John Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in FTC Act Amendments and Autiwrization, 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 598, at 37 (May 31, 1983). 
179. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 136, at 6. 
180. To speak of degrees of determinancy would be more accurate. It has been often 
demonstrated that no legal rule is determinate. See Singer, The Player and the Cards: 
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L. REV. 1, 14-19 (1984). 
181. There is reason to believe that the Commission originally had some sort of cost 
benefit analysis in mind in the use of the reasonableness standard. Hearings, supra note 
94, at 10. For example, Commissioner Douglas stated that, "The purpose of the 
reasonable consumer standard is simply to ensure that the Commission does not 
prevent most consumers from hearing useful information ...." Miller Letter, supra note 
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ment intervention is necessary only where the market itself is unable 
to yield "efficient" results. 182 At a later point in this article, it will be 
demonstrated that efficiency is not necessarily the only legitimate 
goal of government. However, as a point of departure, it will be 
helpful to begin by considering the effect of deceptive advertising 
and Commission regulation in terms of the value of economic effi­
ciency. From a societal viewpoint, to the extent that advertising 
causes consumers to purchase products they would not otherwise 
purchase, there is a misallocation of resources. The society would 
satisfy better the wants and needs of consumers who had accurate 
information. However, if the goal is "efficiency" (i.e., reducing mis­
allocation of resources), that efficiency is denied only if avoiding the 
consumer's mistake costs less than the mistake itself. Therefore, ef­
ficiency occurs when the party who can avoid the purchase under a 
166, attached statement ofCommissioner George W. Douglas, at 2 (without it members 
of Commission could block useful ads at their whim). 
This suggests an intent on the part of the Commission to consider the cost of the 
regulation. Also, the Commission's statement is based on a memorandum by the 
Bureau of Consumer Protection which advocates that the Commission should pursue 
only "reasonable" constructions of advertising which would operate "efficiently." 
MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 11. Mr. Timothy Muris, the Director of the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection at the time the memorandum was prepared and its presumed 
author, has stated that, "Our guiding principles are based on economics...." Remarks 
ofTimothyJ. Muris Before the National Association of Manufacturers (March 10, 1983). 
Although the Commission statement is couched in language to indicate that it is not a 
deviation from past Commission policy, the tests for deception, particularly the use of 
the words "reasonable" and "likely," are the same as those set forth in the 
memorandum which acknowledges itself to be a correction of past abuses. 
In that memorandum advertising regulation is discussed in terms of the costs and 
benefits of restricting information. MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 10. As indicated 
above, members of the Commission objected strenuously to the new policy statement. 
See Miller Letter, supra note 166, attached dissenting statement of Commissioner M. 
Pertschuk; Bailey, supm note 170. They preferred that the Commission determine 
whether a substantial number of consumers are misled regardless of whether they are 
acting "reasonably." Bailey, supra note 170, at 37-52. The dissenters argument appears 
to be closer to an empirical standard. That is, rather than make a judgment regarding 
how sensibly people being misled are behaving, the seller should be responsible for a 
significant amount of misapprehension caused by the advertisement. Suprisingly 
enough, then, the dissenters are closer to articulating an economic standard than the 
majority. When we realize that the majority had an economic standard in mind when it 
used the word "reasonable," it becomes unclear just what the dispute is all about. 
It is argued that the use of the word "reasonable" in tort may represent an economic 
standard. See, e.g., POSNER, infra note 182, at 125. 
182. Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's 
Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1663, 1665 (1974). Efficiency is defined 
as exploiting resources in a way that yields maximum value. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAw (2d ed. 1977). See Veljanovski, The Economic Approach to Law: A Critical 
Introduction, 7 BRIT. J. L. & SOC'Y 158, 169 (1980) ("This departure from the ideal 
outcome of the perfectly competitive market is referred to as market failure and is a 
necessary efficiency condition for legal intervention."). 
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misapprehension at the least cost is made liable for the harm caused 
by that purchase. 183 The law should "mimic" the market, by as­
signing the risk of loss to the party who can avoid the loss at the 
least COSt.184 
For the balance of this article, it will be assumed that the costs of 
the policy decision to prevent some form of advertising conduct 
should be based on the amount the victims of the policy lose as a 
result of the policy's enactment and that the benefits should be de­
termined by the amount the beneficiaries gain. 185 "Victims" of a 
policy can include advertisers as well as consumers who do not ben­
efit from the policy. "Beneficiaries" are the consumers who would 
have purchased a product or service but for the policy. 
The cost to the consumer of avoiding the harm might be spending 
a few minutes at the store examining the product. It could also in­
volve seeking information from other sources. Obtaining access to 
some sources may involve significant costs. Obtaining access to 
other sources, such as Consumer Reports, may be less costly.186 The 
183. Polinsky, supra note 182, at 1663. The buyer is made "liable" if he is given no 
remedy. The rule as stated can be interpreted to protect less sophisticated consumers 
because they would have to go to an extremely high expense to protect against the risk. 
They, therefore, would be less likely to be the cheapest cost avoider. The rule as stated 
is the rule proposed for unintentional torts. It is derived by applying the "Learned 
Hand formula" (i.e., the defendant is guilty of negligence if the loss caused by the 
accident, multiplied by the probability of the accident's occurring, exceeds the burden of 
the precautions that the defendants might have taken to avert it) to both the defendant 
and plaintiff (i.e., contributory or comparative negligence). See POSNER, supra note 182, 
at 122-24. 
184. Polinsky, supra note 182, at 1657. 
185. This analysis is based on an analysis by Professor Markovitz. See Markovitz, 
Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination ofLegal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 1169 (1984). There is some dispute as to how to measure costs and benefits. 
Kennedy, Cost Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A CritiljW!, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 
(1981). This has been discussed as the "offer/ask problem" in regard to arriving at the 
proper formula. For example, to measure costs one could compute the amount 
necessary to pay the losers (victims) for implementation of the policy (the amount that 
would be offered) or the amount that the victims would pay to prevent implementation 
of the policy (the amount they would ask to pay). As indicated in the text Professor 
Markovitz argues that the former is appropriate because the "offer" amount, if given, 
would put the losers back to the status· quo. With regard to the beneficiaries of the 
policy, the "ask" amount would be the amount they would request to reject the policy 
and the "offer" amount would be what they would be willing to pay for implementation 
of the policy. Professor Markovitz endorses the "offer" amount for the above reason. 
The benefit of this rule is, therefore, often equal to the costs of the practice being 
prevented. If consumers' losses of$1 ,000 are prevented by the rule, that is a benefit of 
the rule. Of course, one of the costs of the rules could be benefits of the practice that is 
being regulated. If the rule causes information to be denied to consumers and results 
thereby in certain consumers losing the benefits of the product, that is a cost of the rule. 
186. When we say that a consumer could not avoid the harm, we probably mean that 
for some consumers to avoid the harm would require an exorbitant expense, e.g., going 
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cost to the advertiser of avoiding the harm might be to alter his ad­
vertising in such a way that it fails to inform some customers of the 
product's availability or to create lengthier and more expensive ad­
vertisements. Government regulation of advertising is appropriate 
where the type of deception is more efficiently avoided by sellers. 
The harm that the Commission seeks to avoid results from a con­
sumer purchasing a product under some misapprehension. Ifan ad­
vertisement suggests that a product will provide a particular benefit, 
which in fact it will not, a consumer who believes the advertisement 
and purchases the product suffers harm. 
Even when individual transactions in which the market does not 
provide an "efficient" result can be identified, government interven­
tion can be governed by an efficiency standard, i.e., public resources 
should not be misallocated. 187 Thus, government intervention is 
not appropriate unless it is "efficient." The benefits of the interven­
tion must outweigh the costs of the intervention. This has been rec­
ognized as the appropriate standard in the passing comments of 
various writers. 188 The costs of regulation (where that action is an 
Commission order to cease and desist) include the actual costs of 
the government investigation and prosecution of the action. It also 
must include the costs of the respondent'S defense, because our 
concern is with the total amount of resources consumed by society 
in preventing the practice. 18g Another cost is the extent to which 
back to school to learn how to read better. That might explain protection for 
"vulnerable people." Concern that this standard would lead to governmental 
intervention in too many situations is dealt with by limiting Commission action to those 
situations where it is warranted by the costs to society. It could also describe situations 
where most consumers could avoid a particular harm only by going to exorbitant 
expense. e.g., having a lawyer or engineer with them. 
187. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47. 63 (1969). See 
Veljanovski, supra note 182, at 169 ("It is not a sufficient condition because the costs of 
intervention, both direct and as a consequence of other misallocations it gives rise to, 
may outweigh any efficiency gains.") 
188. For example in Developments, supra note 136, at 1042, the writer states that a 
" 'lowest intelligence' standard ... seems appropriate if the few who might be deceived 
can be protected without significant intrusion on the interests of the advertiser and the 
undeceived majority of the public." See also Pollay, supra note 162, at 637 ("The final 
judgment will eventually be the difficult problem of striking a balance betwen the 
potential social cost resulting from misperceptions of some consumers and potential 
social gain resulting from effective undistorted communication of information from the 
advertiser to the balance ofthe consumers."). Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 146, 
at 501, suggest that "an advertisement is deceptive ifit fails to disclose the information 
that would be optimal under the circumstances. Optimality is based on a cost benefit 
analysis of requiring additional information." This is a basis, however, for designing 
strategies for requiring additional information in advertisements. [d. 
189. In fact, when there is a final cease and desist order, its costs must include a pro 
rata share of all cease and desist investigations which do not culminate in cease and 
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the government prevents advertisers from conveying useful infor­
mation to consumers. 190 It should be emphasized that our society is 
concerned with not just the cost of preventing the particular adver­
tiser who is the subject of a particular cease and desist order from 
conveying a particular piece of information, but the cost of prevent­
ing all advertisers from conveying information as a result of the gov­
ernment's determination of the level by which all advertising will be 
judged. On one level, the cost of preventing advertisers from con­
veying useful information might be relatively easy to calculate. The 
consent order in Reader's Digest Association stated that Reader's Digest 
could not use any simulated item of value in sweepstakes promo­
tions. 191 Therefore, a cost of the order would be application of that 
rule to other sweepstakes promotions.l92 However, it may be neces­
sary to abstract cease and desist orders to a higher level. For exam­
ple, if the Commission says that an advertiser's action is deceptive 
because 12% of the consumers are misled, the cost is banning all 
advertisements that reach that level. 
The benefit of the rule calculates the total harm caused by the 
prohibited practices. The harm incl~des not just the cost of prod­
ucts purchased that would not have been purchased but for the de­
ceptive advertisement but additional harm caused as well. This 
explains Professor Gellhorn's proposal that a lower level of decep­
tion should be actionable where health and safety claims are in­
volved. 193 Presumably, physical injury caused by a tire not 
performing as promised at high speed can lead to exceptionally high 
costs. But that may not be true for all "health" claims. Where a sun 
burn ointment does not stop sun burn "pain" as fast as expected the 
costs may not be so high. Therefore, the health and safety concept 
may be good as a guide but not as a rule.l94 The concept of a cost 
desist orders as well as a pro rata share of all successful respondent's expenses for 
lawyering which forestall cease and desist orders. 
190. See infra notes 230-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of this type of 
cost. 
191. Reader's Digest Assoc., 79 F.T.C. 696 (1971). 
192. The rules were not applied to other sweepstakes' promotions, which was one of 
Reader's Digest's grounds for complaining. See infra note 224. See, e.g., Request to 
Reopen and Modify Consent Order, Exhibit D, Reader's Digest Assoc., Inc., No. C-2075 
(FTC Sept. 30,1983) (demonstrating the many other sweepstakes which used simulated 
items of value). For purposes of determining the value of a particular rule some 
rationality in the process must be assumed, i.e., the same rule will be applied to all 
similarly situated. 
193. See Gellhorn, supra note 141 at 572. 
194. The distinction between personal injury and economic loss is often made in 
consumer protection law. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 
(Alaska 1976); V.C.C. §§ 2-318 (Alternatives A & B), 2-719(3) (1978); RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 38, at § 402A. 
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benefit analysis, explains why lower levels of deception should not 
be actionable. Using a Commission example, the number of people 
who believe that Danish Pastry is made in Denmark is probably few 
enough that the harm is extremely slight. 195 The costs of correcting 
that misapprehension may not be warranted by the benefits. Placing 
a small notice "Not Made In Denmark" probably would not help 
many of those people who are deceived and prohibiting the use of 
the term Danish Pastry entirely would confuse large numbers of 
people seeking the item. A decision to relate Commission action to 
such an analysis would help rationalize Commission decisions. For 
example, the empirical research that estimates the number of con­
sumers misled by an advertisement would be useful in determining 
the benefits of restricting the advertising message. Such a policy 
does away with the need for such moralistic and indeterminate 
words as "reasonable." Moreover, it relates to one of the purposes 
of Commission advertising regulation: protecting the integrity of 
the marketplace. To the extent that the goal is economic an eco­
nomic standard is appropriate. 
Economic analysis accepts achieving "efficiency" as an appropri­
ate goal for public policy. Such a policy, however, does not affect 
the relative allocation of resources in society.196 Yet it is a legiti­
mate goal for government to reallocate resources from the most for­
tunate to the less fortunate. This is an obvious goal of poverty 
programs that make no pretense of doing anything beside providing 
money or goods and services to people based on the recipient's low 
income. 197 
195. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964). 
196. P. BURROWS & C. VELJANOVSKI, THE ECONOMIC ApPROACH TO LAw 12 (1981) 
"The desirability of efficiency as a goal thus requires a value judgment as to the justness 
of the underlying distribution of income and property rights. .. [E]fficiency itself is not 
such a 'momentous achievement from the point of view of social welfare. A person who 
starts off ill-endowed may stay poor and deprived .. .''' One writer demonstrates that 
the wealth maximization goal of efficiency is "biased against the poor and in favor of the 
wealthy." Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect A Bigger Slice? 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 67l, 678 (1980). See Posner, Utilitarianism, Ecanomics, and Legal Theory, 8 
J. LEGAL STUDIES 103, 108, 109 (1979) (economic analysis can be seen as "a theory the 
law seeks to optimize the use and exchange of whatever rights people start out with"). 
197. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-l (West 1983) (prevention and correction of 
dependency and delinquency among children should be accomplished so far as 
practicable through welfare services which will seek to continue living of such children in 
their own homes.); Food Stamp Program, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982) ("To alleviate ... 
hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorized which will permit 
low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of 
trade by increasing food purchasing power for all eligible households who apply for 
participation. "). 
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It may be a legitimate question whether even government regula­
tion of advertising could find a justification in reallocation of re­
sources. Many economists believe that where there is a contractual 
or market relationship it may be difficult or impossible to use the 
legal system to redistribute income, since raising the standard of 
performance for sellers will mean higher costs for consumers.198 
But this observation treats sellers and buyers each as a single class. 
It may, however, be desirable to protect some buyers at the expense 
of other buyers. Thus a legal rule that protects the gullible by sav­
ing them $1,000 may cost other consumers $2,000. But if we con­
cluded that the gullible were poor or otherwise disadvantaged, we 
may decide for policy reasons that it is worth the cost. Efficiency is 
just one of many potential values that society may choose to further 
through governmental intervention. 
The public does not necessarily judge the wisdom of governmen­
tal activity strictly on the basis of economics or wealth maximization, 
even though they may make many personal decisions on that ba­
199SiS. People are often willing to sacrifice for society in general or 
for disadvantaged groups in society when they can be sure that 
others in society are doing their share. For example, one writer is 
puzzled by the fact that he favors government policies for conserva­
tion and protection of the environment but he drives a car that leaks 
oil. He instinctively realizes that a small effort on his part will have 
little impact but he is willing to pay for the environment if it is part 
of a significant societal effort. Therefore, he would favor laws that 
make his wasteful conduct illega1.200 
The poor as a group are particularly susceptible to advertising 
claims.201 Costly, higher standards of honesty in advertising may be 
a particularly effective way of helping those who began life at a sig­
nificant disadvantage.202 Helping the disadvantaged by raising ad­
198. A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 109 (1983). The legal 
system is redistributing income if one group in society must go to some extra expense so 
that another group is not deceived. There is, then, an indirect transfer. One group is 
paying to educate another. 
199. Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions Are Not All 
Economic, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 286 (1981). 
200. Id. 
201. J. HOWARD & J. HULBERT, ADVERTISING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A STAFF 
REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 34 (1973). 
202. !d. at 35 (poor and disadvantaged have special information needs are not 
currently well met). Professor Arthur H. Travers, Jr. has noted that current interest in 
consumer affairs has coincided with the development of a national concern with the 
persistence of poverty in America. Travers, Forward, 17 RAN. L. REV. 551, 553 (1969). 
"[S]tudies have shown that a disproportionate number of the victims of consumer frauds 
have been the sick and the old and the poor." Id. at 555. 
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vertising standards assists them in a more helpful manner than just 
transferring money.203 
The above discussion refers to the use of government regulation 
to reallocate resources in order to alleviate some of the imbalances 
in society. This deals with disadvantages that actually exist. Another 
value that consumer protection promotes is the perception of fairness 
on the part of citizens with regard to the economic and politIcal in­
stitutions of society. That perception is an important aspect of the 
glue that holds society together. Although not necessarily identifi­
able in cost benefit terms, the appearance of fairness may be an im­
portant value to pursue.204 
The above discussion helps to highlight the difference between 
economic analysis itself205 and efficiency goals in the advertising 
regulation context.206 Even if we do not always accept the norma­
tive goal of efficiency the analysis will be helpfuL The economic 
analysis requires the Commission to be as precise as possible re­
garding the costs and benefits of proposed regulation.207 Since the 
regulation of advertising involves regulation of business marketing 
where most of the benefits and costs are monetary in nature, eco­
nomic analysis is more valuable than in areas where it is more diffi­
cult to quantify in monetary terms. But even where the costs of 
regulation exceed the benefits, a thorough analysis will reveal other 
values to be achieved and will help determine whether the cost of 
achieving those values is warranted.208 
203. The food stamp program is another example of this kind of assistance. It may 
also explain the category of vulnerable groups whom the Commission has desired to 
protect. In each individual transaction the "vulnerable" person is probably not the 
cheapest cost avoider but the economic costs of the regulation may be greater than the 
economic benefits. Nevertheless the "vulnerable" status may be an indication that this 
is a group that society wishes to protect at some cost. 
204. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
205. Economic analysis in this context refers to the empirical science that predicts the 
likely outcome of particular legal rules. BURROWS, supra note 196, at 6. Economic 
analysis can be used to predict the costs and benefits of assigning the risk of buyer'S 
misapprehensions. See, e.g., id. at 7. It is a legal impact study "which attempts to identify 
and quantify the effects of law on measurable variables." 
206. See, e.g., id. at 11. (normative allocation efficiency approach to law usually 
proceeds by stating objective of law as minimization of social cost of an activity by 
providing incentives that deter uneconomical losses). 
207. See, e.g., id. at 15 ("The economic approach places at the forefront of discussion 
the need to choose and costs and benefits of alternative choices which must always be a 
relevant consideration where resources are limited."). 
208. [d. at l6-17. ("If there is a conflict between efficiency and justice the nature of 
the trade-offs can be illuminated by economic analysis; and since the attainment of 
justice usually involves the use of resources the economic approach can contribute to 
normative discussions by providing information on the cost ofjustice."). 
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Deception then should be defined as those statements for which 
the cost of prevention would be warranted by the benefits in terms 
of reduced consumer misapprehension of such prevention. Such a 
policy would require the Commission to estimate the costs of 
preventing advertisers from making certain claims and the benefits 
of protecting particular consumers. 
One advantage of the policy endorsed here is that it requires the 
Commission to clearly articulate the social policies and values that 
are being employed. As indicated a pure cost benefit analysis is not 
appropriate.209 But it is better to clearly state that a particular cost 
or benefit is being given greater weight (e.g., protection of a particu­
lar group is or is not worth the cost) than to hide behind vague 
terms like "reasonable."210 Another advantage is that the Commis­
sion would be forced to clearly articulate the way it is using social 
science rather than just to present a lot of numbers and to announce 
the result. 211 The Commission should reveal the conclusions it is 
drawing from the available information. Therefore, even though 
the Commission would not have "perfect" information it would 
have to be rational in its extrapolati~n from what it has.212 That 
reasoning would then be available for public scrutiny. This would 
allow more intelligent analysis and criticism of Commission actions. 
Finally the Commission would be able to use empirical research de­
veloped in one context for decision in another. 
b. Applying the Definition 
In the advertising substantiation program, the potentially decep­
tive statement is the implied statement regarding the likelihood that 
the product will conform to the advertised claim.213 The definition 
of deception used in this article concerns those situations where the 
benefits of clearing up misconceptions regarding the likelihood that 
209. In fact Professor Markovitz points out that a cost benefit analysis in some 
situations would give the ambiguous result that both rejection and adoption of the 
policy are cost benefit justified. See Markovitz. supra note 185. 
210. Governmental instutitions should reveal the "real" reasons for decisions rather 
than hide behind the excuse that the "law" requires the decision. The policy advocated 
in this article would require the Commission to acknowledge its value choices rather 
than hide behind words such as "reasonable" or "deceptive." See Singer supra note 180 
at 51-54. 
211. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
212. Neither the Commission. advertisers nor academia can yet determine with 
precision the degree to which consumer purchase decisions are effected by particular 
advertising messages. 
213. This should be distinguished from the level of substantiation claimed. which is 
the reference point under current Commission policy. See SUBSTANTIATION STATEMENT, 
supra note 19. 
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a product conforms to a claim are warranted by the costs of prevent­
ing that misconception. The benefits of preventing such statements 
will be based on the money that would be spent on a product under 
such a misapprehension that would not be spent if consumers cor­
rectly understood the likelihood that the product met a specified 
standard. 
The benefit analysis should be based on genuine research into 
consumer expectations and not on a vague assertion that consumers 
expect all claims to be substantiated.214 Studies of the effects ofvar­
ious kinds of messages can be used for application in particular 
cases. Many commentators would agree with many of the "indicia" 
of substantiation that the Commission has found in prior cases.215 
For example one writer has shown that the effect of substantiating 
material such as "tests show" or "laboratory tests show" is clear: 
"[I]n most cases [consumers] perceive substantiated claims as more 
reliable and helpful than unsubstantiated claims." Comparison ad­
vertisements may imply "factual information, often in the form of 
scientific tests or independent research has been gathered" as a ba­
sis for the comparison claim.216 A Commission staff report stated 
214. The Commission argues that all claims carry with them the implied claim of 
substantiation. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 59 (1972); Reports, supra note 20; 
Miller, supra note 55, and is often uncontested by advertisers themselves. See, e.g., 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 444 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973). This article rejects the Commission's argument. The 
problem with the Commission's argument and all who make it is that all of those who 
make it find it necessary to qualify the need for substantiation for all claims in ways that 
detract from a coherent analysis. For example, the Consumer Protection Division 
advocated distinguishing between subjective and objective claims. See MEMORANDUM, 
supra note 61, at 67. But then a determination must be made whether claims were 
objective or subjective. It is easier to simply ask whether consumers interpret the ad as 
representing a claim of substantiation without also drawing the objective, subjective 
distinction. Corporations responding to the Commission request for Comments also 
indicated that there was no research indicating that consumers expected scientific 
evidence, laboratory tests, prior written certification, or other specific forms of 
documentation. See, e.g., Sears, supra note 106 at 25-26. 
215. Leigh & Martin, Comparative Advertising: The Effiet of Claim Type and Brand Loyalty, 
in CURRENT ISSUES AND RESEARCH IN ADVERTlSlNG 197840, 50 U. Leigh & R. Martin eds. 
1978). Words like "medically proven" in one part of an advertisement are construed as 
applying to the main part of the advertisement. American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 
695 F.2d 681, 690 (3d Cir. 1983). "Recently laboratory science has perfected" a 
product or the product is "proven and sound" represent that the seller has scientific 
evidence to prove that substantially all users would benefit from the product as 
advertised. Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 302 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
445 U.S. 950 (1980). See also Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21,322 (1983), aff'd, 738 F2d 
554 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Scientific tests show," tests show," laboratory tests show," a picture 
of a computer typewriter printing out numbers while announcer speaks about scientific 
tests only enhances an impression of establishement but does not create it); Standard 
Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1472 (1974), modified, 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978). 
216. Leigh & Martin, supra note 215, at 40. 
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that, "consumers probably infer that ads stating figures to two or 
three decimal points implicitly claim that substantial evidence sup­
ports those figures," and that, "novel claims concerning the techni­
cal properties of a product are likely to imply scientific testing or 
endorsement by a qualified expert rather than consumer 
surveys."217 The Commission's concept of "establishment claims" 
is an effort to attach deceptive' conduct to situations where con­
sumer confidence in advertising claims is increased by scientific ap­
pearance and where the truth of the claim may be difficult for the 
Commission to determine.218 The Commission should identify 
those qualities of products which are "credence" qualities.219 As re­
searchers have demonstrated, credence qualities are the qualities for 
which consumers cannot determine the truthfulness of claims. 
Therefore, consumers are more likely to depend on substantiation 
developed by others-including the advertiser-in determining the 
likelihood that the claim is true. 
Although the Commission has begun to do some empirical re­
search, the Commission appears to be headed in the wrong direc­
tion based on the purposes of the program outlined in this article. 
The Commission is apparently attempting to determine merely the 
level of testing consumers expect advertised products to have.22o As 
indicated above the Commission should be exploring the consumer 
expectations regarding the likelihood that claims are true. Never­
theless empirical research would be a valuable first step for the 
Commission, if the Commission uses the research in the context of 
an empirical standard such as the one advocated in this article. 
Moreover, the Commission must engage in research to determine 
the socio-economic characteristics of those who are deceived by 
false advertising claims. 
Analysis of the benefit factors has focused on those factors that 
increase the number of consumers who believe a particular claim. 
The harm suffered by those who purchase a product under a misap­
prehension must also be determined. Because the analysis will be 
similar to that used for the deceptiveP basis of advertising substanti­
ation, it would be better to postpone consideration of those factors. 
Similarly it will promote clarity to discuss the factors to consider in 
217. MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 13. 
218. See text accompanying notes 117-18, for an explanation of the standard applied 
in establishment claims. 
219. See supra note 61. 
220. The Commission has announced its intention to conduct empirical research 
regarding substantiation but has yet not actually conducted such tests. See infra note 
246. 
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determining the costs of regulation at the same time as this article 
discusses the costs of regulation based on deceptiveP behavior. 
2. DeceptiveP Behavior 
The Commission should require some level of substantiation for 
all claims as a legitimate vehicle for preventing advertisers from en­
gaging in a practice that makes the existence of deceptive claims 
more likely (deceptiveP conduct). If one engages in the practice of 
making claims without knowledge of whether they are true or false, 
claims more likely will be false than if one only makes claims on the 
basis of relevant information regarding the product. The truth or 
falsity of a particular claim is not relevant. Even if the claim is true, 
the advertiser has engaged in a deceptive practice, if the advertiser 
has failed to test the claim before disseminating it. The purpose of 
the substantiation program is to achieve a higher level of accuracy in 
all advertisements by compelling sellers to conduct better testing of 
potential claims.221 The program has been successful in this regard. 
One internal Commission memorandum cited several reports that 
concluded that. the advertising substantiation program had moti­
vated a substantial portion of the advertising industry to develop 
substantiation before disseminating claims. The program had 
served to deter untruthful claims. 222 
Consumer expectations are not relevant in determining the 
amount of substantiation required. Regardless of the amount of 
substantiation consumers expect advertisers to have, the Commis­
sion is making an independent judgment of the amount of substanti­
ation it is reasonable to expect of sellers making particular kinds of 
claims.223 
221. For Robert Pitofsky's statement regarding accuracy in advertising see Pitofsky, 
supra note 69, at 36. 
222. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 12, 23-24. 
Some responses to the Commission's request for comments on the program have also 
indicated that this might be the case. In responding to the request for comments the 
Consumers Union stated that the program had reduced the number of claims for which 
there is no basis and has improved the quality of product performance claims. 
Consumers Union, Remarks in Response for Comments About the Advertising 
Substantiation Program 2 (July 13, 1983) (FTC's request available in 48 Fed. Reg. 
10471) [hereinafter cited as Consumers Union]; NBC, supra note 50, at 4 (substantiation 
received for advertisements improved though they cannot determine cause). 
223. This departure from a consideration of consumer expectations demonstrates a 
difference from the proposed standards considered by the Commission. The 
Commission's policy is grounded solely in considerations of consumer expectations. 
See, Miller, supra note 55, at 2. The approach proposed here resembles in some respects 
the substantiation policy outlined by NBC. NBC has established standards for the type 
of support that is appropriate depending upon the type of claim that is being made, e.g., 
performance claims, ingredient claims, sales and price claims. The susceptibility of the 
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Although a cost benefit type of analysis would also be appropriate 
for determining the types of substantiation to require, the factors to 
be weighed are slightly different. The substantiation rule requires 
sellers to expend resources on additional levels of testing; the cost is 
the cost of the testing. But where the cost of testing exceeds the 
value of the claim to the advertiser, the advertiser will not make that 
claim. Therefore, one potential cost of the program is that consum­
ers will not be aware that products meet particular needs. The ben­
efits are determined by the value of generating the information to 
consumers.224 
The benefit of requiring additional testing is a function of the 
harm to be avoided and the likelihood that a claim may be false. 
The harm that is to be avoided is that consumers might purchase a 
product under a misapprehension regarding that product. The 
measure of the harm may be no more than the difference in value 
between what the consumer thinks he is getting and what he gets 
along with some incidental expenses III aggravation and 
repurchasing. 
There are additional factors that increase the scope of the harm to 
be avoided. Where the failure of a product to conform to consum­
ers' expectations causes property damage or bodily injury, the harm 
is greater than the price of the product. Products, which may cause 
greater harm, are likely to be products where a greater level of sub­
stantiation is in order. A general rule that health and safety claims 
deserve a higher level of substantiation.225 The only reason for cre­
ating health and safety claims as a special category is the potential 
for harm if the claim is not true. Where, however, even if the claim 
is not true there would be no significant health costs, those products 
or claims should be evaluated as more mundane products or claims 
product to the type of testing also is considered. For example, for performance claims, 
although testing in normal use is preferred, large items such as washing machines can be 
lab tested. NBC, supra note 50, at 8-12. NBC claims it requires advertising claims for 
over the counter drugs and health related products to be supported by well-controlled 
clinical studies. In the case of non-comparative claims the network relies on the FDA 
OTC panel monogram studies. Id. at 11-12. 
224. Note that this statement in text differs from stating that the costs must be less 
than the benefits. For a discussion of the proper application of a cost benefit analysis, 
see supra notes 181-235 and accompanying text. 
225. See, e.g., American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 697 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(controlled clinical tests required for nonprescription analgesic); Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398,456 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 414 
U.S. 1112 (1973); Stihl, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 840,851 (1983) (one controlled test required 
for chain saw claims based on safety considerations). In terms of consumer 
expectations, the Consumers Union suggested higher standards for health and safety 
claims as well as "large ticket items." Consumers Union, supra note 222, at 11-12. 
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are evaluated.226 In Bristol-Myers Co. the harm of headache remedies 
not conforming to the claim was in reality more limited. There were 
no allegations that the pills would be worse than aspirin or that they 
would cause harm of which consumers may not be aware. But the 
Commission's substantiation requirements were exacting, even 
though the Commission did not base its rather strict substantiation 
requirements on more than generalized concerns regarding health 
and safety claims.227 
The size of the manufacturer or the size of the advertising cam­
paign in question is another factor in measuring the scope of the 
harm.228 Where a small manufacturer or a limited ad campaign in­
226. Another reason for requiring a higher standard for health claims is that, 
"Pervasive government regulation of drugs and consumer expectations about such 
regulation create a climate in which questionable claims about drugs have all the more 
power to mislead." American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 697 (3d Cir. 
1983). 
227. But see American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 698 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(health risks may be significant because "[t]he larger dosages of aspirin which AHP 
exhorts consumers to ingest increase the dangers of adverse side effects, with little 
evidence that there' exist any countervailing benefits"). However, here the Commission 
is probably proceeding under deceptive' since many indicia of claims of testing are 
present in the case. Otherwise, the standard of two clinical tests may have been too 
harsh. Clinical tests are required of all drugs by the FDA to be sure the product is both 
safe and effective. For that reason, it may be sufficient to require only one clinical test if 
there is no concern of significant health risks. See Comment, supra note 113, at 469. 
Therefore, the citing of all of the potential health risks in taking aspirin in American Home 
Products may not have been appropriate. 
Bristol-Myers raised a more troubling issue for advertising substantiation. The 
manufacturer suggested that it would have been appropriate for participants in studies 
to know the product they were using since the expectations created by the advertising 
may actually cause a reduction in pain. Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 335-36 (1983) 
aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984). The manufacturer argued that the placebo effect 
must be taken into account for medicines directed at pain. The Commission dismissed 
this argument summarily. !d. Bristol-Myers suggested, however, that the advertising 
itself is part of the product. If consumers are willing to pay an additional amount for a 
product that kills pain faster, does it matter that part of the effectiveness of the product 
is the consumers' predisposition that it will be effective? It may be that where a 
manufacturer makes this type of claim it should be allowed to use evidence from studies 
where the administrators of the test do not know the product the subject was using but 
the subjects do. However, the other products possibly should be accompanied with 
some assurances of their quality. It might also be true that if no products were allowed 
to advertise that their ingredients are better than aspirin, the placebo effect currently 
enjoyed by well marketed brands would then be enjoyed by what consumers now see to 
be "just plain old aspirin." 
A better basis for the standards applied in the drug cases is the fact that the claims 
involved are easily susceptible to the type of controlled studies that the Commission 
required and that a "testing industry" for these products is already in place. These 
factors are "cost" factors; they suggest that stricter standards are appropriate for drug 
products because rigorous testing standards would not be prohibitively expensive). 
228. One writer suggests that small manufacturers should be allowed to rely on the 
general state of medical knowledge or the tests of larger manufacturers. See Comment, 
54 CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 55 
dicates that the advertising will not cause a significant amount of 
harm the government's regulation may not be warranted. 
The likelihood that a claim is false must also be evaluated in de~ 
termining the benefits of a proposed substantiation standard. Fur~ 
ther study is likely to be cost effective to the extent that it is highly 
likely that it produces new information regarding the efficacy of a 
product. For each product it is important to determine the likeli­
hood that further testing would reduce the harm that the product 
will not perform as claimed. 
The actual cost of conducting tests is easily determined. The 
Commission, however, has not paid attention to the actual cost of 
testing they have required.229 Advertisers in submitting comments 
to the Commission provided no information on the costs of tests.230 
But the cost most often referred to by the program's critics is the 
inhibition of the dissemination of useful information to consumers. 
supra note 113, at 448. But see Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 68 (1972) (cannot rely on claims 
of competitors but might be able to rely on competitors study). See Cacioppo & Petty, 
Persuasiveness of Communications Is Affected by Exposure, Frequency and Message Q;t<1lity: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Persisting Attitude Change, in CURRENT ISSUES AND 
RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING 197897, 114 (1. Leigh & R. Martin eds. 1978) (repetition of 
strong arguments increases persuasive effect). 
229. In Thompson Medical Co., it was found that clinical tests would cost $30,000. 
The Commission contrasted this cost to Thompson's six million dollars in sales. 104 
F.T.C. 648, 823-24 (1984). 
Because advertising substantiation will impact advertising, a more appropriate 
comparison might be with a company's advertising budget. For example, Thompson 
Medical Co. spent 39 million dollars on advertising in 1984. Comparable figures for 
other advertisers discussed in this article are: Kellogg Co., $208,000,000; Bristol-Myers, 
$258,000,000; Sterling Drug, $166,000,000; Fort $559,000,000. See ADVERTISING AGE 
September 26, 1985, 1l and ADVERTISING AGE June 13, 1985, 11 for tables listing 
corporate advertising costs. 
230. This statement is based on the author's examination of comments submitted to 
the Commission. Chairman Miller acknowledged that little information was supplied. 
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This criticism has been raised by the Commission,231 advertisers,232 
and independent observers of the program.233 
There are, however, a variety of factors that could limit the 
amount of damage that the program would cause in inhibiting the 
dissemination of useful information to consumers. Advertisers may 
obtain advisory opinions from the Commission to determine 
whether the advertiser has sufficient substantiation for a claim.234 
Advertisers may also place disclaimers on their advertisements limit­
235ing the impact of their messages. However, when using disclaim­
ers deceptive' and deceptiveP claims would be handled differently. 
Where the commission is concerned that the claim of substantiation 
increases the impact of the advertisement, which is true in the 
deceptive' situation, a disclaimer would be effective to limit that im­
pact. However, where the Commission is concerned with the 
amount of substantiation necessary to support a claim-a deceptiveP 
consideration-a statement indicating the amount of substantiation 
that the advertiser actually has to support the claim may not be suffi­
231. "[O]verly burdensome substantiation requirements prevent consumers from 
receiving useful information." MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 28; FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, CONSUMER INFORMATION REMEDIES 259-60 (1979) (focus on objective 
claims may have led advertisers to use more subjective claims). Chairman Miller has 
placed special emphasis on the risks of suppressing truthful claims. See Miller, supra note 
136, at 1. 
232. Several advertisers who responded to the Commission's request for comments 
devoted a considerable amount of time to the problem of getting information to 
consumers. See, e.g., Sears, supra note 106, at 27 (claiming even though substantial costs 
may have been incurred in developing performance information for product, ultimate ad 
copy may be significantly "watered down" or some claims even deleted if serious 
concern arises over what subsequent Commission interpretation might be). Although 
claiming that potentially valuable information that would help reasonable consumers 
make an informed decision is not communicated, Sears and other industry respondents 
give no examples. Sears does say that a review of Sears advertising since 1971 shows 
that it has become generally less informative about product features and benefits, but 
acknowledges that this is due as much to rising advertising costs as to the Commission 
Ad Substantiation Program. /d. at 34-35. 
233. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 106, at 437. A typical comment was the following: 
"Lots of the effects of the program are to drive advertising from some sort of factual 
claim which mayor may not be verified at the time it's made (it may not be capable of 
being completely verified), into puffery." Tollison, "Efficiency," "Cost Benefit" and Other 
Key Words-The Practical uses of Economics at the FTC, 51 ANTITRUST LJ. 581, 584 
[hereinafter cited as Tollison]. 
234. The Commission Rules of practice so provide. 16 C.F.R. § 53.16(d) (1984). See, 
e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, (1965); Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 
21 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984). 
235. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 
1984) (advertiser can carefully qualify claim "so that it discloses the level of support 
actually possessed"). 
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dent. The advertiser would have to modify the claim itself. 236 The 
problem of disclaiming in deceptiveP situations is highlighted in the 
"substantial question" theory adopted by the Commission in the 
237American Home Products Corp. v. FTC case. The theory, which was 
only one basis ofliability, provided that when the seller made claims 
about the superiority of Anacin and Arthritis Pain Formula in the 
absence of two well controlled clinical studies it was deceptive to fail 
to state that there was a substantial question regarding the truth of 
the claim. The theory was presented in a confusing manner, partly 
because the court appeared to be papering over Commission vacilla­
tion regarding whether the theory of the case was "reasonable ba­
sis" or "substantial question."238 But the Commission's policy can 
be easily understood as follows: it is deceptive for the advertiser to 
make claims regarding the effectiveness of a drug without the appro­
priate amount of testing. To say merely that "we base this claim on 
our president'S use of the product" would not be a sufficient dis­
claimer. But to say "there is a substantial question in the scientific 
community regarding this claim" would have the effect of changing 
the nature of the claim itself; it would minimize the scope of the 
claim. . 
Manufacturers have complained that the Commission does not al­
low sellers to quality claims.239 In some instances the Commission 
has rejected qualifications that were contained in advertisements as 
ineffective. For example, when Ford Motor Company placed adver­
tisements stating that "all 5 Ford Motor Co. small cars get over 25 
mpg," the Commission required substantiation that the gasoline 
consumption rates were acquired through the performance an ordi­
236. A similar policy is evident in the severe limitations imposed on sellers restricting 
the effectiveness of express warranties. See, e.g., UCC § 2-316 (1978): 
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty 
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be 
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but . . . 
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction 
is unreasonable. 
Similarly some state statutes restrict sellers' ability to limit remedies for express warran­
ties. Md. Commercial Law § 2-316.1(3) (1983)(severely restricts modifications or limita­
tions on remedies pertaining to express warranties). 
237. American Home Prod. Corp. v. ITC, 695 F.2d 681, 694 (3d Cir. 1983). The 
"substantial question doctrine" was abandoned by the Commission. See Bristol-Myers 
Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aJl'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984). As demonstrated in the 
text the theory was a valid complement to other aspects of the advertising substantiation 
doctrine and not duplicative as indicated by the Commission. The theory is an 
expression of the advertising substantiation doctrine directed at deceptive" claims. 
238. See American Home Prod. Corp. v. ITC, 695 F.2d 681, 694 (3d Cir. 1983). 
239. See, e.g., The Kellogg Company, Remarks in Response to Request for Comments 
on the Advertising Substantiation Program 3 (July 14, 1983) [hereinafter cited as 
Kellogg]. 
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nary driver typically would obtain from standard models.240 The 
Commission took this action despite the fact that the ad contained 
the following statement: 
[T]he mileage you get depends on many factors: equipment, 
engine displacement, vehicle weight, local road conditions, 
and your personal driving style. So the mileage you get may 
be less or even more than the figures quoted here.241 
But this case can be explained by the sharp difference between the 
bold headline and the small print retraction.242 The Commission, 
therefore, judged the likelihood that consumers would understand 
the significance of the disclaimer. It is doubtful that the Commis­
sion was preventing consumers from benefitting from valuable in­
formation where the advertisement actually conveyed untrue-or at 
least unsubstantiated-information. Moreover, to evaluate the 
Commission's action in terms ofcost it is necessary to determine the 
value of the information being restricted. If the information, 
though true, is not really significant to the purchase decision, noth­
ing of value is being lost. In Ford Motor Co., consumers were not 
given informat~on regarding expected fuel consumption costs or the 
relative fuel consumption costs of several cars under typical condi­
tions. Treatment of disclaimers would be different in deceptive' and 
deceptiveP cases. To the extent that the disclaimer modifies the 
claim, it mitigates a finding of deception in deceptiveP cases. To the 
extent that it modifies the assertion regarding the likelihood the 
claim is true, it mitigates against a finding of deceptiveS conduct. 
In some cases, the Commission may have required substantiation 
requirements that deny consumers information they might like to 
have and, at the same time, may have done so in a way that pre­
vented sellers from making a legitimate disclaimer. For example, 
the Commission required scientific tests as opposed to the opinion 
ofRoad & Track magazine that the Vega was "the best handling car." 
If handling is strictly a matter of opinion and if consumers are inter­
240. Ford Motor Co., 87 F.T.C. 756 (remand order), reh gdenied, 88 F.T.C. 53 (1976), 
93 F.T.C. 873 (1979). 
241. Id. at 759. Another case that illustrates this point is Camp Chevrolet, 84 f'.T.C. 
648, 650 (1974) (respondent's advertisement was reprint of newspaper story describing 
mileage test and contained similar disclaimer). 
242. Ford, supra note 240, at 764. The ten words in the claim (HAll Ford Motor 
Company Small Cars Got Over 26 MPG") occupy twelve times as much space as the 37 
words in the disclaimer. For the wording of the disclaimer, see supra text accompanying 
note 241 and see Uf. at Exhibit A, 759. 
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ested in the opinion ofRoad & Track, there is no way to convey that 
·information to consumers.243 
Close analysis reveals that prior Commission decisions have not 
actually prevented consumers from obtaining needed information. 
The Kroger Co. case is an example of a Commission decision that 
prevented an advertiser from distributing what appears to be useful 
information. This is a favorite example frequently used by Timothy 
Muris, former director of the Consumer Protection Division.244 
Kroger, a large supermarket chain, created a "Price Patrol" in which 
homemakers surveyed prices of 100 to 150 items in local supermar­
kets. The most significant aspect of the practice that concerned the 
Commission was that the same Kroger official who selected the 600 
products to be part of the sample also set the prices for Kroger. 
The Commission found that the advertisements implicitly repre­
sented that the surveys were "methodologically sound" and that the 
surveys were not methodologically sound.245 Since other surveys 
indicated that Kroger's prices were frequently below or equal to its 
competitors in many product lines, Mr. Muris cites this as an exam­
ple of Commission action which deni.es consumers valuable infor­
mation. Although the Commission has never before required 
studies that conform to the high standards of reliability as it has 
done in Kroger, Kroger's advertising was deceptive' because it 
claimed that its price comparison information was backed up by a 
rigorous survey.246 Therefore, the Commission properly held Kro­
ger to a higher standard of proof regarding its price comparison 
243. Of course, it is a matter of empirical research whether claims of smooth 
"handling" effect consumers' expectation of the likelihood that the car will be easier for 
them to drive and whether the car comports with that expectation. However, for 
purposes of the "burden shifting" effect of the substantiation doctrine the advertiser 
does have some substantiation for the claim. But for the purpose of the deceptive 
practices aspect of the advertising substantiation program it may be that more expensive 
scientific tests are not worth the value of the information. 
244. 98 F.T.C. 639 (1981), modijied, 100 F.T.C. 573 (1982). A criticism of the case is in 
MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 27. 
245. !d. at 743. However, Kroger claimed it minimized the problem somewhat by 
having some other person select the 100-150 product sample from the 600 product 
selection. MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 27. 
246. See, e.g., Tashofv. FTC, 437 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Guides Against Deceptive 
Pricing, 16 C.F.R. pt. 233 (1986). Kroger claimed that it made it clear that this survey 
was just being conducted by housewives. Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C. 639, 770 (1981), 
modified, 100 F.T.C. 573 (1982) (Commissioner Bailey dissenting). However, it is quite 
likely that to the consumer the statement that the study was conducted by housewives 
increased the perceived validity of the study. This statement gave the impression of a 
high degree of disinterestedness of those conducting the study. To the consumer this 
may appear to be similar to the randomness required in empirical research. This 
illustrates the distinction made in this article between basing substantiation 
requirements on the type of substantiation consumers expect (the Commission 
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with other stores. The argument that the Commission is denying 
consumers useful information must be questioned. The informa­
tion is not useful if it is not true. Moreover, the critics of the opin­
ion never consider the cost to Kroger of conducting studies that 
comply with the Commission's standards. Only if the cost of such 
studies is prohibitively high could it be argued that information is 
denied as a result of the Commission's rule. 
The one example of an advertising substantiation program deny­
ing consumers access to valuable information is the claim by The 
Kellogg Company that "the public was denied information on food, 
health and nutrition because the Commission will not accept as ade­
quate substantiation the type of epidemiological evidence and opin­
ions of medical authorities that exists to support certain claims in 
this area." Kellogg stated that even though epidemiological studies 
show that populations consuming high fiber diet have a decreased 
incidence of certain diseases of the colon, such as diverticulosis, the 
Commission probably would not allow the following statement: 
current scientific data tends to support the fact, if you eat a 
higher fiber diet, you will be less vulnerable to certain 
diseases.247 . 
But Kellogg never requested permission to run such an advertise­
ment and could point to no Commission decision where such a cau­
tious, qualified statement has been prevented or where such 
evidence would not be permitted for such a claim.248 Moreover, fol­
lowing its assertion that the substantiation policy prevented such ad­
vertisements, Kellogg actually did run advertisements making health 
claims.249 Therefore, despite the many claims that the advertising 
substantiation program limits consumers access to valuable infor­
approach) and consumers expectation regarding the likelihood that the claim is true (the 
approach proposed in this article). 
247. The Kellogg Company, Remarks in Response to Request for Comments on the 
Advertising Substantiation Program 3 (July 14, 1983). For a discussion of Chairman 
Miller's response to the Kellogg submission, see Miller, supra note 136, at 5. 
248. In the case cited by Kellogg, J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 
1967), the commercials portrayed Geritol as suitable for most instances of "tiredness." 
The relative communicative strength given to various aspects of the advertising message 
were considered in determining the nature of the claims actually made. 'Finally, Kellogg 
points out that the Food and Drug Administration, not the Commission, is a more likely 
opponent of the hypothetical claim. See Kellogg, supra note 239, at 3. Of course, 
criticism of the FDA is not criticism of the Commission. 
249. Interestingly enough the advertisement appears to exaggerate the product's 
value in preventing cancer and glosses over other potential health problems related to 
the product, such as the product's high sodium content. 
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mation, few, if any, examples have been produced which actually 
prove that point.250 
One study that tests the hypothesis that advertising regulation 
reduces the amount of useful information available to consumers. 
The study was conducted with reference to the advertising substan­
251tiation program. It has been cited for the proposition that the 
advertising substantiation program has in fact caused advertisers to 
reduce the amount of factual information placed in advertisements 
and replaced that information with "puffery" oflittle use to consum­
ers.252 The study compared the advertising for two types of prod­
ucts that had been subject to advertising substantiation rounds 
(anti-perspirants and pet foods) with two types of products that had 
not been subjected to advertising substantiation rounds (skin lo­
tions and prepared foods). For each product the advertising before 
and after the advertising substantiation round were compared. The 
latter group was treated as the control group to determine the effect 
of the Commission action on advertising.253 The study investigated 
a number of hypotheses that would be true if the substantiation pro­
gram did reduce the amount of valuable information in advertis­
ing.254 The study concluded that: 
250. Chairman Miller pointed out that none of the responses to a recent request for 
information contained any empirical evidence of the effect of the program on 
advertising. See Remarks ofJames C. Miller III, Chairman Federal Trade Commission 
Before the San Francisco Advertising Club 6 (September 30, 1983). See also, Tollison, 
supra note 233, at 585 ("But the most remarkable feature about the Ad Substantiation 
program is that nobody knows what it is doing. There never has been a careful 
theoretical or empirical analysis of the impact of the program. "). 
251. J. HEALEY, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION 
PROGRAM AND CHANGES IN THE CONTENT OF ADVERTISING IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES (1978) 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Marketing, Univ. of California, Los Angeles) [hereinafter cited as 
HEALEY]. 
252. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 106, at 457. 
253. HEALEY, supra note 251, at 128. 
254. Compared with the advertisements in the control group, the non-control group 
advertisements would undergo the following changes: 
1. There would be a decrease in the number of product attributes. Id. 
at 29. 
2. There would be greater emphasis given to inherently verifiable 
attributes. Id. at 29. 
3. More claims would either be verifiable on face value or be clearly 
non-verifiable. Id. at 31-32. 
4. There would be more claims of product comparisons rather than 
general product class comparisons. Id. at 33. 
5. The "mood" of advertising would be less authoritative and more 
cautious. Id. at 34. 
6. Advertisements would be either more informative or more non­
informative. [d. at 37. 
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The major finding of this study was the changes in the way 
claims were verified in advertisements after the FTC advertis­
ing substantiation program. Specifically, in 1976 advertise­
ments, either claims were verified within the advertisement or 
they were stated in an ambiguous, non verifiable manner; both 
occurred with higher frequency that the previously used im­
proper way of handling claims, having them just sound verifia­
ble. This confirmed the predictions made in 1972 by industry 
leaders that the advertisers would seek to avoid confronting 
the FTC by making claims which were either "pure pap" or 
very factual in nature . . . 
It appears that perhaps the FTC advertising substantiation pro­
gram might have served the function of making companies more 
conscientious about the claims made in their advertisements.256 
On the other hand, there was some indication that the FTC adver­
tising substantiation program may have, by default, sanctioned a 
rise in the use of puffery, i.e., vague and exaggerative advertising 
statements which cite no specific facts. 257 
There are a number of problems with this study. The study did 
not really involve randomly selected products or advertisements. 
Only print advertising was investigated; there was no consideration 
of broadcast advertising. A number of hypotheses were not proven 
and in a couple cases evidence supported the opposite conclu­
sion.258 Even to the extent that the study detected changes after the 
institution of the program, the study did not attempt to determine 
whether there was a cause and effect relationship.259 More signifi­
cantly, even if the advertising contained less factual information af­
ter the institution of the program, the study did not consider 
whether the information no longer available to consumer was accu­
rate. Perhaps by compelling advertisers to resort to "puffery" the 
Commission is compelling them to abandon the distribution of un­
true information. The study itself quoted one commentator's state­
255. !d. at 125. 
256. !d. at 127. 
257. [d. at 128. 
258. The hypothesis regarding the presence of claims in the advertising was only 
partially confirmed. /d. at 120, 126. The hypothesis regarding the types of attributes 
that were advertised was only partially confirmed. ld. at 121. The hypothesis regarding 
the presence of verification in the advertising itself was confirmed. /d. at 119. The 
hypothesis regarding product comparisons "did not prove to be true." !d. at 122. The 
hypothesis regarding the "mood" of the advertising was only partially confirmed. !d. at 
121. The hypothesis regarding the informative quaiity of the advertising was not 
confirmed. [d. In fact it was the control group advertising that became less informative. 
/d. at 126. 
259. [d. at 128. 
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ment that puffery is "the ever-diminishing comer into which sellers 
and advertisers have been painted by consumerism."26o Moreover, 
a demonstration that advertising has become less authoritative may 
also be a sign of the program's accomplishments. Advertisers may 
be less likely to couch unsubstantiated claims in misleadingly scien­
tific language. This is a demonstration of the positive effect of the 
program in limiting deceptiveS conduct. 
There are a few "cost" factors in utilizing the problem which have 
been suggested but which are not proper considerations. The Com­
mission apparently believes that a proper factor to consider as a cost 
of substantiation requirements is the "benefit to consumers if the 
claim turns out to be true."261 For example, in Sperry Corp. the man­
ufacturer claimed that the razor would solve the problems of razor 
262bumps for black men. The Bureau of Consumer Protection has 
argued that in demanding claim substantiation the Commission 
should consider the potential benefits of the claim being true.263 
Another example is apparent in the advertising claim that products 
low in cholesterol help reduce the incidence of heart disease.264 
The Bureau of Consumer Protection argued that if the claim is false 
consumers lose a few cents but if it is true consumers will have less 
risk of heart attack. In Sterling Drug, Inc., the Commission modified 
an order that had originally prevented the manufacturer of Lysol 
from claiming that use of Lysol on environmental surfaces would 
reduce the risk of illness.265 The Commission relied upon recent 
evidence that some illnesses could be transmitted by contact with 
environmental surfaces.266 Chairman Miller argued that if the claim 
was true consumers would be healthier but if it was not true, "con­
sumers are injured only to the extent of the cost of their Lysol 
purchase.' '267 
Nevertheless in the context of allegations of deceptive' behavior 
the concern should be with the likelihood that the claim is true. As 
indicated in a separate statement by Commissioner Pertschuk in 
Sterling Drug, the tests did not indicate a high degree of likelihood 
260. !d. (quoting PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLOW Up 5 (1975». 
261. Miller, supra note 55, at 3. 
262. Sperry Corp., 98 F.T.C. 4 (1981). 
263. MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 27. 
264. !d. at 20. 
265. 101 F.T.C. 375,379 (1983). The modified order allowed Sterling Drug to make 
claims that environmental surfaces play role in transmission of viruses, if supported by 
competent and reliable scientific evidence. 
266. Id. at 337. 
267. Id. at 382 (separate statement of Chairman James C. Miller III). In each of the 
above cases, dramatic potential benefits are weighed against what appears to be minimal 
cost. 
63 1986] ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION 
that the claim was true.268 Therefore, the Commission should have 
considered a way in which the claim could have been presented dif­
ferently to consumers.269 In the context of allegations of deceptiveP 
behavior the calculation of the amount of substantiation must be 
based on the cost of additional testing and the potential harm to be 
prevented. To accept the advertiser's claimed benefit as a measure 
of the potential benefit of the claim being true would be illogicaL 
Otherwise there would be an incentive for advertisers to make wildly 
optimistic claims. The true calculation is the probability that the 
claim is true and whether the claim cannot be made without testing. 
Moreover, in each case the harm caused by the claim may be under­
stated. The few cents that are lost must be multiplied by the mil­
lions of purchases involved. Consumers may forego better ways of 
avoiding the problem for which the product is purchased. For ex­
ample in the Lysol case, the advertising claims might have caused 
consumers to become less vigilant about the proper procedures for 
avoiding infection. Similarly in the "cholesterol" advertising cam­
paign, consumers might not have taken other steps to reduce the 
risk of heart attack. 
One last factor in determining the appropriate level of substantia­
tion is usual industry standards.270 However, this is not relevant in 
either deceptive' or deceptiveP actions. In deceptive' cases, con­
sumer expectations control. In deceptiveP actions the Commission 
should search for those industries where a significant amount of ad­
vertising is presented without sufficient basis and make efforts to 
upgrade industry standards rather than accept an industry norm of 
inadequate substantiation. Thus, the level of substantiation cur­
rently conducted in an industry is not an appropriate standard. 
V. BURDEN OF PROOF 
The proposed application of an advertising substantiation policy 
with regard to deceptiveS conduct upsets the traditional assignment 
268. Id. at 383. Of course, Sterling Drug can prove it true to escape liability. 
269. In fact, examination of the advertising that Lysol disseminated revealed an 
attempt to exaggerate the likelihood that the product performed as claimed. The tag 
line "Is it worth the cost?" implied that it was. For Lysol Advertising on file with 
University of Cincinnati Law Review, see SSCB & Lintas Worldwide's Storyboard. 
270. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., Remarks in Response the FTC's Request for 
Comments About the Advertising Substantiation Program 22 (March 11, 1983) 
[hereinafter cited as Sears) (FTC's request available in 48 Fed. Reg. 10471). It is likely 
that by saying the Commission would be guided by "the amount of substantiation 
experts in the field believe is appropriate for the claim," Chairman Miller is implying 
such a consideration. Otherwise, he would not need to establish it as a separate 
consideration along with the costs and benefits. See Miller, supra note 55, at 3. 
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of the burden of proof upon the Commission as the one attacking 
the advertising.271 The requirement for substantiation in all adver­
tising claims violates the standard burden of proof presumption be­
cause the seller is required to present proof that the product 
conforms to certain claims and, failing to do so, is considered liable 
for violating the FTCA.272 Since the Commission has abandoned 
the program's purpose of serving as a source of information for con­
sumers and competitors273 requests for substantiation no longer 
serve any purpose other than to compell advertisers to prove that 
they are not violating the law.274 However, none of the respondents 
to the Commission's request for comments stated that they objected 
to the demands for information because the demands raised burden 
of proof problems.275 All arguments that the program shifts the 
burden of proof have been made in the context of litigating the 
terms of cease and desist orders, not as objections to the advertising 
substantiation program.276 In one case the Commission ordered a 
seller of eyeglasses to refrain from claiming to sell any articles of 
merchandise at a "discount price". The Commission required that 
the seller first take a statistically significant survey that showed 
whether the prevailing price was indeed "substantially" higher than 
the seller's price.277 One member of the court felt that the require­
ment improperly shifted to the seller the burden of "proving its 
innocence."278 
The law, however, does allow courts to recognize the presence of 
presumptions with regard to a party's obligation to meet the burden 
of presenting evidence. The advertising substantiation program in 
the deceptiveS context should be viewed not as shifting the ultimate 
burden of proof but rather as shifting the production burden to the 
27 L Commission rules provide that: "Counsel representing the Commission ... shall 
have the burden ofproof, but the proponent of any factual proposition shall be required 
to sustain the burden of proof with respect thereto." 16 C.F.R. § 3.43 (1986). 
272. See generally Gellhom, Rules of Evidence and Ojfo:ial Notice in Formal Administrative 
Hearings, 1971 DUKE L J. 1,35-36 (1971). 
273. See infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text. 
274. In that situation the lack of substantiation would merely be discovered in the 
course of preparing the information for the public. Now, however, the Commission 
claims no other purpose for the substantiation demands than investigation of potential 
sources oflitigation. It appears that the Commission initiates a deception case against a 
seller by asking the seller to prove that the advertisement was not deceptive. 
275. This statement is based on the author's examination of the documents. 
276. See, e.g., Jay Norris v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979)(petitioner sought 
review ofCommission cease and desist order which prohibited mail order business from 
advertising without prior written substantiation of representations). 
277. Tashofv. FTC., 437 F.2d 707, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
278. /d. at 716 (Robb concurring in part' and dissenting in part). 
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advertiser. It is not uncommon to place the production burden on 
the party with access to the relevant information.279 
Secondly, the substantiation program creates a presumption that 
unsubstantiated claims are not true. In the deceptive' context the 
concern is with the likelihood that the claim is true. However, it may 
be possible to establish that where an advertiser does not possess 
the level of testing claimed it is likely that the claim is not true. The 
Commission presumes that, absent additional evidence from the ad­
vertiser, the claim is not true.280 
The Commission must still meet the ultimate burden of proof on 
each issue. Once the advertiser has produced evidence of substanti­
ation the Commission must demonstrate the degree to which con­
sumers expect the claim to be true and demonstrate that the 
substantiation does not support that expectation. 
The Commission may be expected to independently establish the 
level of substantiation needed for each claim in deceptiveP actions. 
Advertisers should only be required to demonstrate the level of sup­
port that they possess. The Commission still comports with the pol­
icy of placing. the burden of proof on a moving party by 
demonstrating that it has some rational basis for the selection of 
advertisers from which the Commission requests information. 
VI. POST CLAIM SUBSTANTIATION 
Another issue raised with regard to the advertisement substantia­
tion program is whether advertisers should be allowed to introduce 
post-claim evidence.281 In situations where a claim was not substan­
tiated at the time the advertisements were first disseminated, the 
seller may be able to produce substantiation for the claim when re­
quested by the Commission. The stated policy of the Commission is 
that only substantiation deVeloped at the time the claim was first 
disseminated is relevant. 282 Many advertisers complain that the 
279. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 950 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). 
280. Courts have recognized similar presumptions. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF 
TORTS § 209 (4th ed. 1971). For example, courts were willing to presume that a 
statement is made with fradulent intent when the claim is made without a sufficient basis. 
For references to deceit and misrepresentation cases and articles see supra note 135. 
281. This issue is distinguished from the procedural issue involving the advertiser's 
substantiation at the time the advertiser disseminated the claim but, for one reason or 
another, did not submit it in a timely fashion to the Commission. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.4 
(1984). 
282. In Pfizer, Inc., the Commission made it clear that for purposes of the ad 
substantiation requirement, it is essential that substantiation "be possessed [by the 
seller] before the claim is made." 81 F.T.C. 23, 64 (1972) (emphasis in original). See 
Reports, supra note 20 (Commission resolution requiring submission of substantiating 
materials developed "as they had in their possession prior to the time claims, 
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Commission's rules are too rigid and that it does not make sense to 
punish an advertiser who makes a true claim. 
Advertisers have recommended three exceptions: implied claims, 
a demonstration of good faith by an advertiser, and a demonstration 
by the advertiser that the claim is true. The reason given for advo­
cating consideration of post claim evidence when there are implied 
claims is that the advertiser at least has a reasonable argument that 
the claim was not actually made. In other words, at the time the 
seller disseminated the advertisement, the seller did not realize that 
a particular meaning was being inferred by the public and therefore 
did not develop substantiation for that meaning.283 Businesses have 
argued that the advertiser's "good faith" should be taken into ac­
count in determining whether post claim substantiation should be 
admitted. The basic argument is that where the advertiser made the 
claim in "good faith" nothing is to be gained by extracting a punish­
ment if the advertiser can demonstrate a reasonable basis for the 
claim.284 When claims turn out to be true, it has been argued that it 
is a waste of Commission resources to prosecute advertisers who are 
not making deceptive statements.285 
statements, or representations [were] made ... "). Notwithstanding this rule, the 
Commission staff has considered this post claim evidence in deciding whether to 
recommend further proceedings against the advertiser. MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 
29-30 n.57. One Administrative Law Judge has stated that post-complaint evidence 
proving the claims would bear on the public interest in the proceeding. Litton Indus., 
97 F.T.C. 1,46 n.27 (1981). For reasons discussed in this section of this paper, that view 
would be incorrect. In Porter 1& Dietsch, the seller of appetite suppressants for weight 
control was denied the right to have an FDA report considered since it was prepared 
after the advertising presentation had been made. Porter & Deitsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 
F.2d 294, 302 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980). Given the above 
analysis, the court was in error where the focus of the action was the truth or falsity of 
the advertising claims. 
283. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 29; Sears, supra note 270, at 24 ( "The post­
claim results corroborating the pre-claim results confirm the reasonableness of the 
advertiser's reliance on the pre-claim results as well as confirm the truthfulness of the 
claim."); Ass'n ofNational Advertisers, Inc., Remarks in Response to the FTC's Request 
for Comments about the Advertising Substantiation Program 2 (June 22, 1983) (FTC's 
request is available in 48 Fed. Reg. 10471) [hereinafter cited as ANA] (recommending 
that where claim is not explicitly stated and is alleged by Commission to be implied 
substantiation developed at any time should be admissible to support the truthfulness of 
the claim). 
284. See Sears, supra note 106, at 23-24; Consumers Union, supra note 222, at 10 ("a 
flat no subsequent evidence rule where there was good faith could discourage [product 
evaluation],,). Timothy Muris, former Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, 
has also suggested that the Commission should distinguish between evidence developed 
before and evidence developed after a claim is challenged by the F.T.C. Because 
substantiation developed before the Commission challenged the claim is credible and is 
not developed to complicate Commission enforcement it should be considered. 
MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 30. 
285. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 61, at 30. 
• 
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Chairman Miller stated that there is "strong support for the idea 
that substantiation should exist before the claims are made," and 
the Commission has not adopted a special rule for implied claims 
but has outlined situations where the Commission will consider post 
claim substantiation. The four exceptions are when (1) evaluating 
the truth of the claim; (2) deciding whether there is public interest; 
(3) deciding the appropriate scope of the order; and (4) assessing 
the reasonableness of the prior substantiation.286 
The issue of the acceptability of post claim substantiation should 
be analyzed separately for each of the two purposes of the advertis­
ing substantiation program identified in this article. For deceptive' 
situations the purpose is penalizing advertisers who make untrue 
statements regarding the product itself. Advertisers should be al­
lowed to prove that the statement is actually true; that the claimed 
likelihood that the product has particular benefits is true. However, 
for deceptiveP practices, the truth or falsity of the claim is not rele­
vant. It is the practice of making claims without sufficient basis that 
is being punished. An advertiser who makes statements without 
knowing whether they are true or false is likely to make some false 
statements even if the particular statement for which he is being 
prosecuted turns out to be true. Pursuing unsubstantiated but true 
claims does not waste Commission resources because once the 
Commission has identified an advertiser who engages in deceptiveP 
conduct it is appropriate to proceed and capitalize on the invest­
ment in the investigation that brought the advertiser to the Commis­
sion's attention. Post claim substantiation should never be 
admissible in such cases.287 This is a more rational approach to the 
question of post claim substantiation. The Commission's four ex­
ceptions add nothing and may only serve to confuse matters. 
Chairman Miller was correct in stating that it is analytically incon­
sistent to apply a different standard where implied claims are in­
volved. The intent of the advertiser is not at issue in Section Five 
actions. The meaning of the claim is decided in the same way it 
would be in any other Section Five case. The advertiser must take 
the risk that an advertising claim will be interpreted in a variety of 
286. DECEPTION STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 4-6. 
287. The exceptions noted by the Commission are appropriate only as long as the 
issue ofwhether the advertiser had a reasonable basis at the time it made the claim is not 
forgotten. Interestingly enough, the one court which found making an unsubstantiated 
claim was a violation of the Lanham Act emphasized that substantiation had to be in the 
possession of the advertiser at the time the claim was made. See Johnson & Johnson v. 
Quality Pure Mfg., Inc., 484 F. Supp. 975, 983 (D.N]. 1979). 
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ways. The advertiser must have substantiation for all interpreta­
tions a substantial number of people are likely to make.288 
VII. RULE OR ADJUDICATION 
The setting of substantiation requirements may be conducted 
more appropriately by rulemaking as opposed to adjudication.289 
Presumably a rulemaking proceeding is more appropriate when the 
Commission intends to require conduct that was not considered le­
gally necessary until the enactment of the rule. An adjudicated order 
is more appropriate where the legal standard has already been es­
tablished. The Administrative Procedure Act defines a rule as "an 
agency statement of general or partial applicability and future ef­
fect"290 and should be adopted by agency rulemaking proce­
dures.291 The Supreme Court has held that a rule within the 
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act was invalid when 
promulgated within an adjudicatory context. 292 Yet the Court has 
given agencies considerable discretion in determining whether to 
proceed by rulemaking proceeding or by adjudication.293 
288. A substantial number is that amount that raised it the statement to deception 
under § 5. 
289. The original Federal Trade Commission Act did not expressly empower the 
agency to engage in rulemaking. Nevertheless courts recognized the agency's power to 
do so. See National Petroleum Ref. Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672,697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
em. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Congress explicitly granted the power in the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-637, § 202, 88 Stat. 2183 (1974), codified 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1982). 
As indicated, some Commission rules already have substantiation components. 
However these rules do not set forth specific substantiation requirements. 
290. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 344 (1982). 
291. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). For example, a dishonest 
claim is dearly a violation of the proscription of deceptive practices and therefore 
should be dealt with in an adjudicatory proceeding. But when the Commission wanted 
to require advertisers to include energy consumption information in advertising for 
certain electrical products, it was more appropriate to require those disclosures in a rule 
making proceeding. Adjudication is more appropriate where only one company is being 
pursued; rule making is more appropriate to change the conduct of an entire industry. 
292. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). The Court upheld the 
reasoning of the First Circuit in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir. 1968), 
that a prior NLRB rule announced in an adjudicatory proceeding regarding the 
furnishing of employee lists was invalid. The First Circuit reasoned that it was not 
adopted by rulemaking proceedings, but because the NLRB had also ordered the 
company to supply lists in an adjudicatory context, its order could be upheld. An order 
to supply the lists was appropriate but a rule that lists should be furnished was not 
allowed. 394 U.S. at 766. But see American Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 
695 n.22 (3d Cir. 1983) (court notes that party did not allege that Commission abused 
its discretion by announcing substantial question test in an adjudicative rather than in 
rulemaking proceeding), 
293. The Commission has announced rules prospectively in adjudicatory 
proceedings. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). The Commission announced the 
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Rulemaking would not be as effective in the deceptive' context 
because with deceptive" conduct the advertising substantiation doc­
trine is only a vehicle for dealing with misleading statements regard­
ing product claims. In the deceptiveP context rulemaking may be 
more appropriate because the Commission is often developing in­
dustry standards divorced from consideration of common industry 
practice. In deceptiveP cases the Commission could develop more 
coherent regulations for each industry by the use of a rulemaking 
proceeding. The Commission has developed cease and desist or­
ders for individual companies based on the particular deceptive 
practice in which each company engaged.294 This has led to some 
confusion and inconsistency.295 Moreover, other products and 
companies have not been involved. A better procedure may be a 
rulemaking proceeding in which the true costs and benefits of par­
ticular standards could be explored on an industry wide basis. The 
Commission to a certain extent has attempted this cost benefit anal­
ysis for some industries and particular types of claims.296 
Recently the Ninth Circuit reversed an Commission order on the 
grounds that the rule applied was inappropriate for a cease and de­
sist proceeding and should have been announced as a rule.297 The 
Commission had held in the context of a cease and desist proceed­
ing that it was a deceptive trade practice for an automobile dealer to 
fail to account to consumer debtors for surpluses generated from 
the foreclosure of repossessed cars. There, however, the court was 
dealing with conduct that was presumably generally accepted in the 
reasonable basis standard, id. at 62, but did not find Pfizer liable. The Commission staff 
had argued that, for a product like Un-burn, a reasonable basis could only be met by 
controlled clinical tests. Id. at 73. The Commission refused to order a remand stating 
that "the significance of this particular case lies, therefore, not so much in the entry of a 
cease and desist order against this individual respondent, but in the resolution of the 
general issue ofwhether the failure to possess a reasonable basis for affirmative product 
claims constitutes an unfair practice ...." /d. at 73-74. 
294. Advertising standards are now developing for over-the-counter drugs. See, e.g., 
American Home Prod. Corp. v ..FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d CiL 1983); Bristol-Myers Co., 
102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), alf'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984); Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 
395 (1983), alf'd, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th CiL 1984), Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 
648 (1984). Interestingly enough it was an over-the-counter drug, Un-Burn, which was 
involved in the first advertising substantiation case. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). 
Surprisingly, in Sterling Drug, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 375 (1983), the Commission modified an 
order dealing with claims of health benefits (the use ofLysol to prevent disease) without 
considering the body of Commission law in the area. 
295. See, e.g., the court's difficulty in dealing with the Commission's substantial 
question doctrine discussed supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text. 
296. See, e.g., Rules for Using Energy Costs and Consumption Information Used in 
Labeling and Advertising for Consumer Appliances Under the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act, 16 C.F.R. § 305 (1986). 
297. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th CiL 1982). 
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business and which was arguably consistent with the governing stat­
ute, the state's VCC.298 Even to the extent that the advertising sub­
stantiation requirement is seen as prohibiting only deceptiveP 
behavior, it still involves the prevention of the likelihood that decep­
tion occurs. It is unlikely that the business community would claim 
that the practice had been common prior to the Commission's 
decision.299 
Although it was appropriate for the Commission to announce the 
new advertising substantiation doctrine in the course of an adjudica­
tive proceeding, the Commission should consider whether it would 
be strategically better to enact rules that establish substantiation re­
quirements for particular products or for particular types of claims. 
There are some decided disadvantages in attempting to develop a 
rule under which to operate the advertising substantiation program. 
The Commission would have to define with specificity the standards 
for determining what constitutes sufficient substantiation.30o The 
Commission may not be able to accomplish that in a single rule that 
applies to all industries.301 The Commission would have to develop 
an elaborate cost benefit analysis.302 However, the economic costs 
and benefits would only be the beginning of the analysis. A political 
determination of the desirability ofwithstanding the cost would also 
be essential. Developing a rule might be a waste of funds since 
298. See, F. MILLER & B. CLARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 422 
(1980). 
299. For the argument that it is not acceptable to use the practices of the industry 
involved to determine whether behavior is deceptiveP, see supra note 270 and 
accompanying text. The claims are from the business community in general and not just 
the particular industry of the advertiser whose advertisement is challenged. 
In fact, many of the responses to the Commission's request for comments regarding 
the advertising substantiation program indicated that even before the announcement of 
the Pfizer doctrine they would not make claims without substantiation. See, e.g., Proctor & 
Gamble Co., Remarks in Response to the FTC's Request for Comments About the 
Advertising Substantiation Program 1 (July 14, 1983) (FTC's request available in 48 
Fed. Reg. 10471) [hereinafter cited as Proctor & Gamble]. 
300. Rules must "define with specificity ... unfair or deceptive acts or practices...." 
15 U.S.C. § 57a(I)(B) (1982). 
301. See, e.g., Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(emphasizing specificity in rules). The Gibbs decision is discussed supra note 75, and 
accompanying text. 
302. See EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 36 n.84. The statement of basis and purpose 
that accompanies the rule must include "a statement as to the economic effect ofth rule. 
. .." 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(I)(C) (1982). Some rules must be accompanied by a 
"regulatory analysis" that contains an analysis of "the projected benefits and any 
adverse economic effects" of the rule. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3(b)(I)(G) (1982). The contents 
of the regulatory analysis are not subject to judicial review. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3(c)(l) 
(1982). Although not explicitly provided for by statute, presidential orders require cost 
benefit analysis by the Office of Management and Budget. See Executive Order 12498 
(January 4, 1985), Executive Order 12291 (February 17, 1981). 
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there is now a developing body of case law dealing with the substan­
tiation doctrine. A rule would not save the Commission a great deal 
of effort in enforcement since the Commission would still need to 
use the same procedures it now uses to detect violations. In addi­
tion, the agency might be abdicating to the courts its discretion to 
determine the advertisement's implied message and to evaluate the 
adequacy of the substantiation.303 
An advantage of proceeding by rule is that civil penalties imposed 
when the practice is flrst detected might provide a greater deterrent 
than the cease and desist order which provides for penalties only 
when there is a violation.304 The FTCA does, however, permit the 
Commission to notify businesses not parties to the cease and desist 
proceeding of the nature of the cease and desist order. Persons with 
such notice may be liable for violating the order.305 However it is 
not clear if a general cease and desist substantiation order could be 
treated this way. Rather the order would have to be very specific. 
For example the order in Bristol Myers specified the types of claims 
and the required substantiation that could be made applicable to 
other over-the-counter analgesic manufacturers. There is no record 
of any Commission prosecution of violations of substantiation cease 
and desist orders under this provision. 
303. When the Commission issues a cease and desist order it conducts an 
adjudicatory process to which courts grant great deferrence, whereas in the case of a 
rule violation the Commission brings the original complaint directly before the Court 
with no prior adjudication by the agency. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(I)(A) (1982). 
304. Civil penalties and restitution are available for the first violation of a rule. 15 
U.S.C. § 57(a)(I)-(i) (1982). Generally no penalty accompanies a cease and desist order, 
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(I)(B) (1982), unless the Commission requires corrective advertising. 
See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), mt. denied, 435 U.S. 
950 (1978). The advertiser is only subject to civil penalties if the advertiser violates a 
cease and desist order. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (1982). Those penalities may include 
restitution to consumers if it is an act or practice that a reasonable man would know is 
dishonest or fradulent. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2) (1982). That section has not as yet been 
applied in an advertising substantiation context. 
305. In 1975, the following provision was added to the FTCA. Pub. L. No.,88 Stat. 
2183,93-637 (1975): 
If the Commission determines ... that any act or practice is unfair or 
deceptive, and issues a final cease and desist order with respect to such 
act or practice, then the Commission may commence a civil action ... 
against any person, partnership, or corporation which engages in such act 
or practice 
(1) after such cease and desist order becomes final (whether or not 
such person, partnership or corporation was subject to such cease and desist 
order). and 
(2) with actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or 
deceptive and is unlawful. . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(I)(B) (1982) (emphasis added). 
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VII. INDUSTRY ROUNDS 
There has been considerable debate over the appropriate way for 
the Commission to conduct investigations to determine the level of 
substantiation that advertisers have for particular claims. As indi­
cated above306 soon after announcing its intention to require claim 
substantiation the Commission began conducting "industry 
rounds." These rounds involved sending requests for substantia­
tion to all major sellers in a particular industry. In 1971, requests 
were sent to seven automobile manufacturers, twelve television set 
manufacturers, and eight dentrifrice manufacturers.307 
The industry rounds procedure underwent a number of changes 
since 1972. Early rounds focussed more on express claims in adver­
tisements while in 1974 the Commission began to focus on claims 
implied in advertisements as well.308 The rounds consisted of sum­
maries of advertisements run by the manufacturers with a series of 
claims which the Commission stated may be expressed or implied in 
the advertisement. The Commission then included the following 
demand: 
With regard to each of these claims and without regard to 
whether you believe that the specified claims are contained in 
advertisements, state whether or not the Corporation had sub­
stantiation for each of the specified claims at the time of the 
initial and each subsequent dissemination of such advertising. 
For those claims which the Corporation maintains are substan­
tiated, submit all documents, back-up data and any other 
materials that support, refute or otherwise relate to the claims. 
Your submission must include all substantiation, in any form 
upon which the claim is based and upon which the Corpora­
tion relied at the time of the dissemination of the 
advertising.309 
The Commission began in 1973 to apply case selection criteria to 
the selection of industries and claims to investigate.3Io Another 
change was attempted in 1976. Rather than surveying advertisers in 
particular industries the Commission experimented with cross in­
306. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
307. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at Appendix A, pages 1-2. 
308. See, e.g., Sears, supra note 270, at 7. 
309. ld. at Exhibit B page 2. 
310. Although a variety of criteria were explored, the following is representative of 
the considerations applied: 
With regard to selecting products and industries the staff 
recommended that the Commission must 
(a) focus on concentrated, ologopolistic controlled industries ­
dominated by a few companies; 
Id. at 19. 
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dustry rounds in which the Commission would focus on types of 
claims. For example, the Commission questioned four manufactur­
ers regarding the use of the results of preference polls in advertis­
ing3ll and questioned seven advertisers regarding energy savings 
claims.3l2 
For reasons of budget and program emphasis no industry rounds 
have been conducted since 1977. The Commission has relied on a 
technique referred to as "informal demand letters." These letters 
are sent to specific advertisers in response to a review of their adver­
tising and request substantiation of specific claims. Demand letters 
differ from Industry Rounds in that they do not have the force of 
compulsory process. If an advertiser refuses to respond to the let­
ter, the Commission would then have to issue a Civil Investigative' 
Demand in order to compel production of the information.sIs 
The Commission has announced that it is formally abandoning 
the use of industry rounds.S14 In announcing the changes in the pro­
gram Chairman Miller indicated that most of the respondents to the 
request for comments suggested that the Commission abandon the 
use of industry wide rounds and concentrate on individual investiga­
tions. He concluded that the rounds were time consuming and not 
cost effective for advertisers as well as the Commission itself.315 
The Chairman correctly summarized the comments submitted to 
the Commission316 but it is peculiar that he relied so heavily on the 
conclusion of advertisers that the industry rounds are not an appro­
priate procedure for the Commission.317 The broad industry 
rounds do appear to have advantages that cannot be achieved by the 
informal demand letters. The sending of multi-firm detailed com­
pulsory surveys seems to have a significant deterrent effect on ad­
vertisers.318 The Commission staff has expressed the view that the 
31 L !d. at Appendix A, page 9. The advertisers were SCM Corporation, Standard 
Brands, Inc., Ford Motor Co., and Radio Corp. of America. 
312. Id. This included four manufacturers (Carrier Corp., Eureka Co., Toshiba 
America Co., Tappan) and three advertising agencies (Young & Rubicam, Inc., N.W. 
Ayre, ABH International, Hakuhodo Advertising, Inc.). 
313. !d. at 30. It is not clear whether refusal to comply with an informal demand letter 
would be grounds for the Commission to allege that the advertiser does not have 
substantiation for a claim. 
314. SUSTANTIATION STATEMENT, supra note 19. 
315. Miller, supra note 136, at 4. 
316. ANA, supra note 283, at 2. 
317. He refers to them as "commentators" (a word usually reserved for scholarly 
comments on the law) rather than industry respondents or commentators. But see 
Consumer Union, supra note 222, at 3 (also questions use of industry rounds). 
318. The House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs 
report on the activities of the Division of National Advertising, concluded that the 
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"failure to exhibit a strong enforcement presence in challenging 
ambiguous or unsubstantiated claims would weaken the impact of 
the program and encourage other advertisers to emulate the 
practices."319 
Neither a demand letter procedure nor a subpoena provide the 
Commission with the power to require specially prepared reports 
such as a "layperson report" which can aid the Commission or the 
general public.32o The industry rounds provide an excellent vehicle 
for the Commission to attack deceptiveP behavior.521 Moreover, by 
requiring information of an entire industry or of advertisers which 
use similar advertising it is possible for the Commission to discover 
exactly where deception may be most prevalent. Rather than accept 
the argument that advertisers should use industry standards, the 
better approach might be to assume that it is in those industries 
where all advertisers use inadequate substantiation that the Com­
mission's actions would be most profitable. Especially in reference 
to deceptiveP behavior, the one role the Commission can play is to 
gradually develop standards industry by industry.322 There are par­
ticular industries in which deception is more likely to occur. It is in 
those industries where deception is more widespread that competi­
tors may be less likely to attack the substantiation of other 
advertisers.323 
In considering the costs and benefits of industry rounds it has 
been argued that the use of industry rounds may have significant 
costs. Chairman Miller stated that rounds were found to impose 
substantial costs beyond those associated with firm specific requests, 
section 6(b) rounds had a beneficial deterrent effect. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 26 
n.77. 
319. [d. at 19. 
320. Demand letters, despite their names, invite voluntary compliance. Subpoenas 
(or Civil Investigative Demands) can only be used to obtain documents already in the 
recipient's possession. Section 6(b), however, enables the Commission to require 
people to prepare reports. Section 6(b) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1982), and is 
set out supra note 21. 
321. The House Committee on Government Operations expressed the view that 
industry rounds had a strong deterrent effect and encouraged the Commission to revive 
the program. See House Committee on Government Operations Federal Trade Commission 
Oversight-Rulemaking, Advertising, and Consumer Access, H.R. Doc. 472, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Oversight]. 
322. See supra text accompanying note 294. 
323. In Pfizer, it is stated that one of the things they did was make sure they were not 
promising more than their opponents. 81 F.T.C. 23, 71 (1972). Only by rounds would 
we find that nobody in the industry has any proof for that particular claim. See 
Consumers Union supra note 222, at 3 (rounds should be used when the types of claims 
that are the subject of the inquiry are in widespread use). 
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without yielding corresponding benefits for law enforcement. 324 
However, not one of the advertisers who responded to the request 
for comments gave any indication of the costs involved in preparing 
industry round requests.325 This is peculiar since this is the sort of 
information that should be easily within their grasp. A logical con­
clusion is that the expense is minimal. 
Another cost of the use of the industry round procedure is the 
extensive time it takes, both to prepare the surveys and to analyze 
the responses.326 The Commission began developing ways to pre­
pare the requests in a more timely manner and it would seem that, 
with less necessity for clearance to circulate the letters,327 the Com­
mission should be able to develop adequate requests early. The 
Commission might begin by requiring selected industries to submit 
advertising campaigns prior to their dissemination. 
Advertisers also complain that Commission requests state that 
there are implied messages that the advertiser does not feel are con­
tained in the ad. When the Commission requests substantiation the 
advertisers have no vehicle to contest the Commission's interpreta­
tion of the advertisement.328 However, to the extent that Commis­
sion policy with regard to determining when advertisements are 
deceptive and what interpretations of advertisements sellers are re­
sponsible for become clearer this should not be a problem. 
It may be that as a vehicle for dealing with deceptive' behavior, 
industry rounds are not necessary. The Commission could deter­
mine in advance where it believes advertisers are making claims of 
substantiation and can easily ask for the specific tests that relate to 
324. Miller, supra note 136, at 4. 
325. See, e.g., Sears, supra note 270, at 35 (acknowledges not having any "hard data" 
identifying the dollar cost of complying with Commission requirements). In a review of 
all of the industry submissions to the Commission this writer could find no estimates of 
the costs of compling with Commission requests. The closest is the following: 
Since 1972, Proctor & Gamble has been involved in four industry 
substantiation sweeps dealing with 23 of our brands, and over 50 
separate claims. As a result of these inquiries, we have submitted over 
1000 pages of data and documents. The mere physical task ofassembling 
this material consumed hundreds of hours and cost many thousands of 
dollars. 
Proctor & Gamble, supra note 299, at 2. One reason companies may be reluctant to be 
specific regarding costs is that they often also state that they develop substantiation any­
way. See, e.g., ld. at I ("[W]e have operated since the imposition of the 1972 'Pfizer 
doctrine' very much as we did before."). 
326. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 31-32. 
327. One way Congress could make the industry round process more efficient would 
be to eliminate the requirement that questionnaires be approved by the Officer of 
Management and Budget before they are circulated. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1980,44 U.S.C. § 3507 (1982). 
328. Sears, supra note 270, at 14. 
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those claims. A demand letter would be sufficient for that purpose. 
But where we are dealing with deceptiveP behavior industry rounds 
may be a relatively inexpensive way of beginning the process of de­
veloping industry wide standards. 
VIII. PUBLIC INSPECTION 
A primary goal of the early ad substantiation program was that the 
public itself would be able to use the substantiation data in evaluat­
ing products and that sellers would police the advertising of com­
petitors.329 In fact the then Chairman of the Commission hoped 
that, "As we increase the flow of relevant information, we may 
thereby increase the consumer's ability to make rational choices be­
tween competing products, and thereby diminish the necessity for 
formal commission action. . .."330 For this reason an important 
aspect of the program when it was first announced by the Commis­
sion involved making the substantiating materials available for pub­
lic inspection. 
However, this aspect of the program never achieved its antici­
pated results. Commission records revealed that the substantiation 
material were infrequently inspected.331 There is no indication that 
the available materials were used in a significant way.332 In 1973 the 
Commission staff began thinking of the advertising substantiation 
program as an integral part of the Commission's law enforcement 
program. In other words substantiation should be viewed merely as 
one step in developing a case for litigation.333 The coup de grace was 
the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 which 
prevented the Commission from making any of the material pub­
lic.334 The Commission has obviously accepted that verdict regard­
ing the effectiveness of the "public education" aspect of the 
program since no mention of it has been made in recent statements 
by Commissioners or staff documents and no question regarding it 
appeared in the public comment notice of 1983. There are a variety 
of reasons for the apparent failure of this aspect of the program. 
Academic institutions, public interest organizations, and competi­
tors did not analyze the documentation as the Commission had 
329. See Reports, supra note 20. 
330. Kirkpatrick, Regulating in the Public Interest, 26 FOOD DRUG COSMo L. J. 593, 597 
(1971). 
331. EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 23. 
332. For example, there is no evidence that the substantiating materials ever spawned 
a competitor or consumer suit. 
333. See EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 14. 
334. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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hoped.335 Partly this was the result of the fact that many respon­
dents submitted vast quantities of highly technical material much of 
which was irrelevant. 336 There also appears to have been a long 
time lag of at least a year between the date the advertising first ap­
peared and the date the substantiation was available to the public.337 
There was some concern that legitimate business interests in trade 
secrets might be endangered by the program. This was partly con­
firmed by the fact that competitors were the most frequent users of 
substantiating materials.338 
The concept of requiring advertisers to make substantiation ofad­
vertising claims available to the public is not unique to the Commis­
sion's 1971 substantiation resolution. Commission cease and desist 
orders require substantiation materials be available to the public.339 
Requiring disclosure of substantiation material is consistent with 
the goal of preventing deceptiveP behavior. The the extent that an 
advertiser knows substantiation will be scrutinized the advertiser 
would be more reluctant to make untrue claims. The degree of 
complexity of the material submitted should not be viewed as a fatal 
flaw in the program. It is probably unreasonable to suppose that 
substantiation materials will be examined by consumers themselves. 
Rather expert consumer intermediaries (such as the Consumers 
Union) would be the most likely inspectors.34o The Commission 
can require advertisers to prepare "lay summaries" or at least sum­
maries which would make expert examination of the material sub­
mitted more fruitfuJ.341 Also competitors would have the expertise 
335. See Comment, supra note 106, at 458 (citing GAO report that indicates that 
consumer groups expressed little interest in date). 
336. "[TJhe public education goal was largely frustrated because the substantiation 
submitted by the advertisers was too technical for the average consumer (or staff 
member) to evaluate." EVOLUTION, supra note 20, at 23. See also Oversight, supra note 321, 
at 21 (material submitted was too technical and scientific for consuming public). In 
proposing the Truth in Advertising Act, Senator Moss reported that some of the 
justification material submitted to the Commission was in foreign languages or in such 
volume as to make the pertinent facts impossible to find. 119 CONGo REC. 11527, 11528 
(1973) (Statement of Sen. Moss). 
337. Oversight, supra note 321, at 12. 
338. See EVOLUTION, supra note 20. See supra note 9 for language added to protect 
trade secrets. 
339. See, e.g., Camp Chevrolet, 84 F.T.C. 648 (1974) (consent order requiring making 
statistical tests or surveys of driving experience available to public). 
340. This author attempted to discover the extent to which Consumers Union did or 
could use substantiation materials. While Consumers Union has used materials 
submitted to the Commission by advertisers, the organization did not know if the 
material had been submitted as part of the substantiation program. See Letter from 
Mark Silbergeld to Charles Shafer (May 22, 1985). 
341. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. In the proposed Truth in Advertising 
Act, the term documentation itself was defined to include a layman's language summary 
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to examine substantiation materials. The fact that they have not 
done so seems unpersuasive. The program was in effect for less 
than 10 years before being completely abandoned. In fact, it ap­
pears that only recently have businesses begun litigating the falsity 
of competitors' claims.342 
The trade secret problem also appears insubstantial. Trade 
secrets can only apply to the content or manufacturing process not 
to whether the product actually performs as promised. Where an 
advertiser claims trade secret protection it should be able to docu­
ment the claimed effectiveness of the product. Therefore, the only 
problem that would arise is where a manufacturer claimed a novel 
ingredient (which is a trade secret) causes a result which is not sus­
ceptible to any kind of substantiation. In this limited case it would 
not be too burdensome to require a clear statement in the advertise­
ment indicating proof of the claim cannot be documented. 
Finally, the fact that advertisers appeared to be so uncooperative 
in supplying substantiation materials may be an indication that the 
attempt of the Commission to assemble materials for public inspec­
tion was a good idea and not a bad one. It may indicate that there 
are actually a significant number of advertising claims which cannot 
be substantiated and that advertisers do not want that information 
readily available for consumers. That may indicate substantial bene­
fits are available which warrant reviving this aspect of the program 
and devoting some resources to properly policing it. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Trade Commission under Chairman William Miller 
has emphasized the potentially negative effects of advertising regu­
lation and has modified much of the regulation imposed by prior 
Commissions. It has done so by arguing that its policies are now 
more rational, empirically based and economically justified. How­
ever, careful analysis reveals that the formulations of words pre­
ferred by the current Commission are no more helpful in making 
rational policy decisions than those of the past. Without a standard 
that gives genuine guidance in evaluating empirical research, such 
research is of little use. 
I have focused on one important aspect of the Commission's reg­
ulation of misleading advertising, the requirement that advertising 
of all tests in support of all claims in the advertisement. S. 1512, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1973), § 3(d)(I)(A), 119 CONGo REC. 11,527-11,528 (1973). 
342. Koten, More Firms File Challenges to Rivals Comparative Ads, Wall St. j., Jan. 12, 
1984, at 27, col. 1. See also NBC, supra note 50, at 4. 
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claims be sufficiently substantiated. By considering the theoretical 
justifications for such a requirement this article has identified two 
essential foundations, the prevention of both "deceptive'" and 
"deceptiveP" conduct, Since deception has primarily economic con­
sequence, an economic standard produces guidance for the proper 
design and use of empirical research. 
The economic standard must be tempered by a recognition that 
economic efficiency is only one legitimate value to be furthered by 
government regulation.343 Therefore the empirical research must 
also be designed to reveal the nature of the groups protected and 
formed by regulation. Regulators can then make political value 
coices without hiding behind the cloak of "reasonable" and "likely 
to mislead". I have outlined the various factors that must be iso­
lated and considered and have demonstrated how they should be 
evaluated. I have shown how an analysis of deceptive" and decep­
tiveP conduct must be different. 
As a by product of my research I have discovered the paucity of 
evidence to support the constant claims th<;lt the advertising sub­
stantiation requirement has exorbitant costs. It appears that a truly 
rigorous empirically based policy would have led the Commission to 
continue rather than abandon the regulatory work of prior 
Commissions. 
343. Richard Craswell has writlen a thoughtful article on deceptive advertising. 
Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U.L. REV. 657 (1985). With regard to 
defining deception he concludes that a less mystical and more quantifiable definition is 
in order. He opts for the following: "An advertisement is legally deceptive if and only if 
it leaves some consumers holding a false belief about a product, and the ad could be 
cost-effectively changed to reduce the resulting injury." !d. at 678. He does not appear 
to recognize the need for the application of the other political values in the process of 
defining deception which I advocate. 
